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Nederlandse samenvatting1 
Sturingsparadigma’s voor de transitie naar een duurzaam energiesysteem 
en hun implicaties voor technologieontwikkeling, een kritische reflectie. 
Het probleem 
Er is te weinig geïntegreerde kennis voorhanden op het gebied van de politiek 
institutionele kanten van de transitie naar een duurzaam energiesysteem. Technologen, 
economen en politieke wetenschappers wisselen hun inzichten op dit gebied nauwelijks 
uit. Hoewel er onder stakeholders een groeiende behoefte aan dergelijke inzichten en 
onderzoek wordt geuit, lijken Nederlandse beleidsmakers een onderzoek naar de 
wisselwerking  
tussen technologieën en instituties minder relevant te achten. In het transitievertoog staat 
immers niet het stimuleren van specifieke technologieën centraal maar het idee dat  
generiek beleid nodig is om marktwerking te prikkelen en te reguleren. De overheid kan 
de vorming van winnende coalities van marktpartijen stimuleren.  
Desalniettemin maakt het beleid in de praktijk toch vele keuzen die specifieke 
technologieën bevoordelen ten koste van andere. Dit komt vooral naar voren in de 
afbakening van beleidsproblemen en in de keuze voor bepaalde beleidsinstrumenten: 
waarom wel een Europees beleid om biobrandstoffen voor de transportsector te 
stimuleren en niet emissievrije of beperkende transportbrandstoffen in het algemeen? 
Waarom kiest de EU voor voortschrijdende normstelling en kiezen bepaalde lidstaten 
voor fiscale maatregelen om het marktaandeel van biobrandstoffen te bevorderen? 
Waarom wordt in Nederland vraagbeperking voor gebouwen via voortschrijdende 
normstelling gestimuleerd (met name isolatie) en ontbreekt een samenhangend beleid 
gericht op investeringen in vraag en aanbod–technologieën? Het lijkt onwaarschijnlijk 
dat op deze en tal van andere  
vragen een eenduidig antwoord mogelijk is. Het maken van keuzes is onvermijdelijk.  
In zekere zin is het problematiseren van de wisselwerking tussen de politiek 
institutionele en de technologische aspecten dan ook het openen van een doos van 
Pandora  
waardoor een breed scala aan discussies en belangentegenstellingen kan worden  
opgeroepen. Vanuit de beleidsoptiek is het wellicht aantrekkelijker om deze discussie uit 
de weg te gaan en het te doen voorkomen alsof het managen van de transitie niet een  
inhoudelijk maar een regieprobleem is, waarbij een slimme vorm van „netwerksturing‟ 
toereikend is om de complexe problemen op te lossen.  
                                                   
1
  Deze explorerende studie werd uitgevoerd in het kader van het NWO/NOVEM 
Stimuleringsprogramma Energie Onderzoek en in het kader van het project Governing the 
Transition to a Sustainable Hydrogen Economy dat wordt uitgevoerd in het kader van het 
NWO/ACTS  
programma Sustainable Hydrogen. De auteurs zijn dank verschuldigd aan leden van de 
commissie Energie onderzoek voor hun commentaar op een eerdere versie van dit rapport. 
Alle verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud ligt bij de auteurs.    
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Er zijn tenminste twee redenen om het politieke karakter van de energietransitie wel te 
problematiseren: ten eerste neemt voor Nederland alsook voor andere geïndustrialiseerde 
landen de urgentie van de overgang naar een duurzaam energiesysteem toe. Een  
beleid dat niet gericht is op het verwezenlijken van lange termijn doorbraken kan op den 
duur wel eens een kostbaar beleid blijken te zijn. Immers, de markt stimuleert partijen 
om steeds de goedkoopste oplossingen voor de korte termijn te zoeken. Ten tweede: er 
zijn, zowel in historische als in theoretische zin, alternatieven voor de sturing van de 
energietransitie voorhanden. Zowel vanuit het oogpunt van politieke rationaliteit als 
vanuit academische nieuwsgierigheid is het de moeite waard deze te exploreren.   
Aanpak van de studie 
In deze explorerende studie wordt nagegaan welke bijdrage politieke theorieën, d.w.z. 
theorieën waarin de relatie tussen overheid en burgers centraal staat, kan leveren aan het 
sluimerende maatschappelijke debat over de energietransitie. Er wordt in deze studie  
uitdrukkelijk niet gekeken naar de doorgaans bestudeerde aspecten als kosten en  
maatschappelijk draagvlak.  
Specifieke doelstellingen zijn: 
1. Een aantal institutionele factoren te identificeren die cruciaal zijn voor het succes van 
technologische opties. Dit gebeurt „bottum-up‟, namelijk door een verkenning van 
enkele als kansrijk beschouwde duurzame energie opties; 
2. Het beschrijven van vier zogenaamde sturingsparadigma‟s die worden afgeleid van 
politieke theorieën. Hierbij gaat het dus niet om onderzoek naar opvattingen in de 
praktijk maar om het verhelderen en rechtvaardigen van verschillende normatief  
theoretische posities die elk op zichzelf consistent zijn; 
3. Te bezien hoe de sturingsparadigma‟s de „kansrijkheid‟ van verschillende 
technologische opties kunnen bepalen; 
4. Het identificeren van relevante thema‟s voor toekomstig beleid en onderzoek. 
Institutionele kenmerken van energietechnologieën 
De volgende opties worden verkend:  
Aan de aanbodzijde:  
1. All electric: elektriciteit wordt grootschalig geproduceerd uit aardgas in combinatie 
met CO2 opslag aangevuld met kleinschalig geproduceerde stroom uit duurzame 
bronnen. Laagwaardige warmte. In deze optie is geen ruimte voor een aardgas-
infrastructuur;  
2. Centrale waterstof infrastructuur (als opvolger van de aardgas infrastructuur) in  
combinatie met decentrale micro warmtekracht. In deze optie is geen ruimte voor een 
elektriciteit infrastructuur; 
3. Grootschalige inzet van synthetisch gas (syngas) uit biomassa met gebruikmaking 
van de bestaande aardgas infrastructuur. 
Aan de vraagzijde: 
4. Demand management: investeringen in vraagbeperking concurreren in de praktijk 
met aanbodtechnologie. Door de individuele keuze mogelijkheden is dit een lastig 
stuurbare optie.  
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Voor de transportsector: 
5. Waterstof al dan niet in combinatie met de brandstofcel. Levering geschiedt via de 
pomp of eventueel via „home fuelling‟.   
Elk van de beschreven opties kan gekoppeld worden aan een reeks van institutionele  
dimensies, waarvan het meest in het oog springen:  
 Is er een strategisch (collectief / nationaal) belang in het geding? Deze dimensie 
wordt toegespitst op het vraagstuk van de voorzieningszekerheid; 
 Is infrastructuur een collectief dan wel een privaat goed?  
 Vindt de productie en levering centraal dan wel decentraal plaats? 
 In hoeverre heeft de consument keuzevrijheid? 
 Is er sprake van afwenteling van externe kosten? 
In de volgende tabel is samengevat hoe, gegeven in het rapport behandelde 
veronderstellingen, de implementatie van de energie opties door institutionele variabelen 
kunnen worden bevorderd dan wel belemmerd.   
Vijf energieopties en hun mogelijke institutionele implicaties. 
 All Electric Centrale H2  Syngas Vraag Transport 
Voorzieningszekerheid Ja 
Meer bronnen 
Nee 
1 bron 
Nee 
1 bron 
Ja Ja 
Collectief-Privaat* Ja Ja Ja Nee Nee 
Centraal-decentraal* Beide Ja Ja Nee Ja 
Keuzevrijheid  Ja Nee Nee Ja Ja 
Afwenteling Ja, bij toename  
decentraal 
Nee Ja, bij groot-
schalige 
import 
Nee Nee 
* Verwijst naar het eerste element van dichotomie. 
 
De exercitie leidt tot een aantal observaties die haaks staan op het in Nederland  
dominante transitievertoog.  
Ten eerste blijkt het allesoverheersende belang van de factor infrastructuur. Opties die 
kunnen profiteren van bestaande infrastructuur (centraal all-electric, syngas of waterstof 
voor de transportsector) hebben betere kansen dan opties waarvoor een infrastructuur 
ontwikkeld moet worden. Zowel vanwege de kosten als anderszins veronderstellen  
keuzes ten aanzien van infrastructuur vermoedelijk ook in de toekomst een hoge mate 
van overheidsbemoeienis vanwege het collectieve goed karakter van infrastructuur  
voorzieningen. De conclusie dringt zich op dat, naarmate een optie hogere 
infrastructurele investeringen vergt, meer specifiek overheidsbeleid noodzakelijk is, 
terwijl bij lage kosten van de infrastructuur een generiek beleid kan volstaan (syngas).  
Ten tweede lijken opties die realiseerbaar zijn binnen het kader van de gevestigde  
belangen in de energie sector (infrastructuur) een streepje voor te hebben op opties die 
zich (vooralsnog) ontwikkelen in de marge van de gevestigde netwerken. Dit heeft er 
ook mee te maken dat centrale productie en levering gemakkelijker te sturen zijn dan  
decentrale opties (kleinschalige all-electric of woningisolatie).  
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Ten derde zijn opties die kunnen profiteren van bestaande infrastructuur niet 
vanzelfsprekend de beste uit het oogpunt van voorzieningszekerheid of keuzevrijheid  
consument. Dit geldt voor centrale H2, syngas en een op aardgas of syngas leunende 
centrale all-electric variant. 
Ten vierde, en in tegenspraak met het vorige punt, een substantiële toename in decentrale 
all-electric in combinatie met demand management en eventueel „home fuelling‟ lijkt 
hoger te scoren op voorzieningszekerheid maar lijkt ondermijnend voor de gevestigde 
belangen in de energiesector. Bovendien heeft deze optie een potentieel afwentelings-
effect, want consumenten zullen niet snel bereid zijn mee te betalen aan de infrastructuur 
die nodig is om overschotten op te vangen. Deze optie laat zich vanzelfsprekend ook  
lastig sturen, maar het belang van een goede infrastructuur is niet minder groot dan bij 
een centrale voorziening.   
Hoewel deze observaties het karakter hebben van tentatieve hypothesen, gebaseerd op 
wellicht discutabele veronderstellingen, leiden zij wel tot een zeer relevante conclusie: 
institutionele factoren en de bijbehorende politieke keuzes hebben, naast technologische 
en economische factoren die hier niet worden behandeld, een verregaande impact op de 
ontwikkelingskansen van duurzame energieopties. Het beeld van de overheid als  
regisseur die via generieke maatregelen innovaties stimuleert, miskent de politieke  
dimensie van het energiebeleid. 
Sturingsparadigma’s 
De onderscheiden institutionele factoren hebben alle een meer of minder geprononceerde 
plaats in sturingsparadigma‟s voor de overgang naar een duurzame energievoorziening 
die zijn ontleend aan de politieke theorie.  
Staatssturing (Governance by Government)  
Dit paradigma steunt op twee cruciale veronderstellingen over de rol van de (nationale) 
staat: ten eerste dient de overheid het algemeen belang (collectieve goederen waaronder 
een efficiënte energievoorziening en een schoon milieu) te garanderen. Hiertoe zijn,  
binnen de grenzen van de wet, alle middelen en instrumenten geoorloofd. Ten tweede: 
bestuurders laten zich in hun beleidskeuzen leiden door „objectieve‟ wetenschappelijke 
kennis. „Social engineering‟ is een sleutelbegrip binnen deze sturingsconceptie. 
Kenmerkend zijn het nagenoeg ontbreken van mogelijkheden tot open participatie en 
debat. Door de dominante aanwezigheid van de overheid, die technologische innovaties 
stuurt, wordt concurrentie tussen ondernemingen aan banden gelegd. Een veel 
aangehaald  
historisch voorbeeld van dit paradigma als beleidsstrategie in de praktijk betreft de  
Amerikaanse ruimtevaart- en bewapeningsprogramma‟s in de jaren 1945 – 1965.  
Volgens velen is deze strategie niet langer haalbaar. Een belangrijke reden is dat 
wetenschap en technologie steeds meer omstreden zijn geworden (kernenergie). 
Tegelijkertijd heeft participatie aan belang gewonnen en daarmee symbolisch beleid, 
gericht op beeldvorming en draagvlak. In samenhang hiermee is social engineering in 
diskrediet geraakt vanwege gevallen van belangenverstrengeling en ontoelaatbare 
staatssteun aan afzonderlijke bedrijven, in Nederland gesymboliseerd door de RSV 
affaire in de jaren 1980. Maar wie weet komt er een nieuwe kans voor dit paradigma 
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wanneer strategische belangen  
zoals voorzieningszekerheid als gevolg van internationale ontwikkelingen en de  
moordende concurrentie tussen energieleveranciers onder druk komt te staan?   
Netwerksturing (Governance by Policy Networking) 
Dit paradigma vormt het hedendaagse alternatief voor het als verouderd beschouwde 
staatssturingsmodel. Er wordt gewezen op een overgang van Government naar  
Governance en de toenemende onderlinge afhankelijkheid van verschillende bestuurs-
lagen (multi-level governance). Stakeholderparticipatie wordt beschouwd als een 
belangrijk middel voor consensusvorming, waarbij praktijkkennis van stakeholders 
positief wordt gewaardeerd. In de beleidswetenschappelijke theorie maken begrippen als  
„belangen‟ en „macht‟ plaats voor begrippen als „discourse‟ en „beleidsgericht leren‟.  
Dit sturingsparadigma legitimeert enerzijds het moderne polderdenken, maar steunt op 
politieke theorieën over consensusdemocratie die dateren uit de periode van de 
verzuiling. Er wordt verschillend gedacht over de mogelijkheden van netwerksturing 
voor het stimuleren van innovaties. Als voordelen van een dergelijke sturingsstrategie 
worden  
genoemd de stakeholderparticipatie en het gebruik van een diversiteit aan kennis, het  
delen van kennis en de pragmatische benadering die win-win uitkomsten 
vergemakkelijkt. Consensusdemocratieën zouden hoger scoren op energie-efficiency dan 
zogenaamde meerderheidsdemocratieën. Als nadelen worden genoemd het hoge gehalte 
aan  
symbolisch beleid en het risico dat netwerk consensus gaat leiden tot het rondzingen van 
als vaststaand aangenomen denkbeelden waardoor kritische en innovatieve ideeën buiten 
de boot vallen. Een voorbeeld zou kunnen zijn dat in Nederland het Ministerie van EZ en 
een aantal stakeholders met elkaar hebben afgesproken dat zon de komende 50 jaar niet 
tot de voor Nederland kansrijke energieopties behoort, waardoor doorbraakinitiatieven 
die gebruik maken van zon de kans lopen genegeerd te worden.   
Sturing door het internationale bedrijfsleven (Governance by Corporate Business) 
De econoom en politicoloog Schumpeter wees er op dat technologische vernieuwing de 
drijvende kracht is achter het succes van de kapitalistische productiewijze. Het 
implementeren van vernieuwingen wordt in de hand gewerkt door de concurrentiedruk. 
In het streven de concurrentie voor te blijven wordt kapitaalvernietiging voor lief 
genomen (creatieve destructie). Het zijn de grote internationaal opererende bedrijven, 
zoals de oliemaatschappijen, die in de energietransitie een trekkersrol vervullen. Zij 
kunnen als geen ander inspelen op internationale ontwikkelingen. Bovendien hebben zij 
een primair belang bij het inspelen op de preferenties en waarden van hun afnemers. In 
dit paradigma participeren consumenten dan ook met name via het marktmechanisme. 
Overheden  
kunnen een (bescheiden) bijdrage aan dit proces leveren maar mogen het niet verstoren. 
Dit betekent dat zij milieuregels mogen stellen en ook financieel kunnen bijspringen, 
mits de concurrentie hiermee geen geweld wordt aangedaan. Concurrentieondermijnend 
zijn bijvoorbeeld het verplicht stellen van bepaalde specifieke opties (biobrandstoffen 
via belastingvrijstelling) maar een beleid dat binnen een lange termijn (pakweg 20 jaar) 
een overgang naar klimaatneutrale transportbrandstoffen regelt kan de concurrentie  
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bevorderen. Gegeven de veronderstelde voordelen voor de consument (gemak, comfort 
en milieuvoordelen) zou de geleidelijke overgang naar brandstofcellen in het vervoer 
wellicht via dit sturingsparadigma te realiseren zijn.   
Sturing door uitdaging (Governance by Challenge) 
Een breed scala aan politieke en sociologische theorieën relateert ingrijpende 
veranderingen in beleid of technologie aan wijzigingen in de samenstelling van 
dominante  
netwerken van actoren. In samenhang hiermee wordt wel gewezen op diepgaande  
veranderingen in de sociaal-economische verhoudingen (productie en distributie van 
goederen en diensten) alsmede de common sense veronderstellingen achter het beleid. 
Het omverwerpen van vigerende beleidsparadigma‟s is wel vergeleken met de door 
Kuhn beschreven dynamiek van wetenschappelijke innovaties.    
Door de monopolievorming in het bedrijfsleven en de toenemende invloed van de  
overheid in het maatschappelijk leven zijn tal van regels, bureaucratieën en intermediaire 
organisaties ontstaan die gevestigde belangen een geprivilegieerde positie geven ten  
opzichte van „nieuwkomers‟. De belangrijkste taak van een innovatiebeleid bestaat er uit 
de gevestigde belangen, waaronder tal van door de overheid zelf gestelde regels, aan te 
pakken, waar deze de concurrentie met innovaties de pas afsnijden. De grootste  
moeilijkheid hierbij is misschien niet zozeer de te verwachten tegenwerking door  
gevestigde machten, maar het feit dat nieuwe mogelijkheden over het hoofd worden  
gezien. Elke status quo beperkt namelijk het waarnemingsvermogen van actoren en 
draagt bij aan een zekere mate van „cognitieve blindheid‟ (cognitive impairment, volgens 
Lindblom). De uitdaging voor de politiek is het ondermijnen van bestaande netwerken 
door het verkennen van opvattingen die niet of slechts marginaal binnen deze netwerken 
vertegenwoordigd zijn. Vanuit dit paradigma geredeneerd zijn afspraken tussen  
departementen en stakeholders over voor Nederland kansrijke energieopties uit den boze, 
want zij ondermijnen de kansen voor innovatie. Een tweede uitdaging voor het beleid is, 
zoals al bepleit door J.S. Mill, het versterken van de keuzevrijheid van de consument en 
de mogelijkheden voor consumenten om controle uit te oefenen op het beleid van  
energieleveranciers, zeker wanneer het (semi)monopolies of overheidsbedrijven betreft.    
Slotbeschouwing 
De vier beschreven sturingsparadigma‟s verhouden zich elk op een eigen wijze tot de 
behandelde energie opties met hun specifieke institutionele kenmerken. Uitgaande van 
de Nederlandse situatie, die gekenmerkt wordt door een zwaar accent op aardgas en een 
sterke internationalisering van de elektriciteitssector, worden enkele tentatieve 
veronderstellingen geformuleerd:  
 De thans meest populaire paradigma‟s met een relatief terughoudende overheid 
(Netwerksturing en Sturing door het Internationale Bedrijfsleven) leiden opmerkelijk 
genoeg tot een situatie waarin de nationale aardgasbelangen vermoedelijk niet  
opkunnen tegen de internationale elektriciteitssector. Een traject richting centrale H2 
infrastructuur, waarbij het elektriciteitsnet overbodig wordt, kan vermoedelijk niet 
zonder overheidssteun worden doorgezet. In het geval deze schoon fossiel optie 
wordt ondersteund met een krachtig CO2 beperkend beleid, dan zal dit beleid door 
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de internationale elektriciteitssector politiek en wellicht ook juridisch kunnen worden 
aangevochten. Een compromis rond syngas lijkt vanuit deze sturingsparadigma‟s het 
meest voor de hand liggend. Een centrale H2 infrastructuur veronderstelt de 
terugkeer naar het paradigma Staatssturing, maar dit is vermoedelijk alleen mogelijk  
wanneer de voorzieningszekerheid of de leveringszekerheid van elektriciteit  
daadwerkelijk wordt bedreigd; 
 Het paradigma Sturing door Uitdaging zal vermoedelijk ruimte bieden aan een traject 
waarin centrale en decentrale opties worden gecombineerd. Hierbij is enerzijds  
aandacht voor de keuzevrijheid van de consument en anderzijds voor het waarborgen 
van een adequate infrastructuur; 
 Klimaatneutrale transportbrandstoffen lijken kansrijk in elk sturingsparadigma. De 
brandstofcel optie voor de mobiele sector lijkt op termijn kansrijk vanuit het  
paradigma Sturing door het Internationale Bedrijfsleven. Er is immers nu al een trend 
binnen de oliemaatschappijen gaande waarin het zwaartepunt van olie wordt verlegd 
naar gas.  
Maar los van deze inhoudelijke hypothesen is de vraag gerechtvaardigd in hoeverre het 
Nederlandse energiebeleid gebaat is bij een meer fundamenteel debat over de vraag naar 
politieke sturing. Met name bij stakeholders uit het bedrijfsleven leeft de opvatting dat 
het overheidsbeleid in Nederland op verschillende gedachten hinkt en dat een 
energietransitiebeleid met de overheid in een regierol, zonder de politiek heikele koeien 
bij de horens te vatten, voor de langere termijn geen soelaas biedt. De theoretische 
exercitie in deze verkenning ondersteunt de opvatting dat er alternatieven bestaan die in 
de nabije toekomst misschien aantrekkelijker zijn. Onder de huidige omstandigheden 
lijkt een  
situatie te zijn ontstaan waarin overheid en bedrijfsleven op elkaar wachten. Met name 
een reflectie en nadere uitwerking van het Uitdagingsparadigma kan misschien een  
impuls opleveren voor politieke interventies die ondersteuning bieden bij initiatieven van 
onderop zonder te vervallen in een benadering waarbij de overheid bepaalt hoe de  
energievoorziening er in Nederland uit moet zien.  
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1. The anti-political bias in transition discourse 
There is a lack of integrated knowledge on the transition to a sustainable energy system. 
Technologists, economists and political scientists hardly interact with respect to their 
disciplinary insights on the institutional aspects of the issue. Although we observe a 
growing interest among stakeholders into further exploring the relationship between 
technologies and institutions2, Dutch policy makers tend to be captured by beliefs that 
render a critical investigation into this relationship less relevant.  
There is a widespread belief in „generic‟ policies. Policies should not be immediately 
aimed at stimulating specific technologies but they should regulate the market. On the 
one hand, economic instruments, especially the establishment of an emissions trading  
regime, is considered particularly fit to facilitate the adoption of low emission energy 
technologies. On the other hand, there is a broadly shared belief in process management. 
Being unable to immediately shape the courses of technological innovation in an era of 
liberalization, government is supposed to focus on network management in order to  
create a shared willingness among economic actors for realizing the energy transition. In 
both perspectives the technologies themselves do not really matter. According to  
transition discourse, government should not see it as its main task to take sides in the 
competition between energy technologies or energy carriers. This is perfectly illustrated 
by a recent Dutch policy document, which states that once a tradable emission system 
has been established, “the right conditions emerge that make the market do the work. In 
conformity with the market, a new selection mechanism for innovations will come up. 
Under these conditions, there is no need for government to make choices – the winners 
will themselves come forward.” According to this document, energy policy so far has 
failed to trigger “creativity, entrepreneurship and innovation. What apparently lacks is a 
„sense of opportunity‟, if policies are too much focused on specific technologies, as has 
been the case until recently.” (Department of Economic Affairs, 2004: 13. authors‟  
translation). 
Obviously, rhetoric and reality are separate things. Neither regulation through emission 
trading schemes nor a sophisticated process architecture would suffice to define the  
actual or future role of government (Dutch or any other) in energy policy. Apart from the 
lasting need for (inter)national investments in research & development, government  
interventions may focus on investments and regulations with respect to infrastructure  
requirements, safety and environmental concerns, as well as on taking early mover  
initiatives. Governments are intervening in many different ways, thereby shaping the 
adoption of specific innovations, possibly at the expense of others. As regards the  
housing and construction sector, progressive standard setting has proved to be a powerful 
instrument to increase the efficiency of domestic appliances and is expected to remain 
very useful in the decades to come. The same is true for the case of improving the  
efficiency of buildings by energy efficiency standards. The EU biofuels directive is 
                                                   
2
  See the conclusions and recommendations from the national stakeholder dialogue in the 
COOL-project (Climate OptiOns for the Long term), in Hisschemöller (2001) and  
Hisschemöller and others, 2001). See also the recent report by Hisschemöller and Van de 
Kerkhof (2004) on the dialogue preceding the Themadag Klimaatverandering. 
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aimed at increasing the share of biofuels for the transportation sector through the setting 
of progressively revised targets. A number of EU member states have already imple-
mented fiscal measures to make biofuels competitive with mainstream fossil transport 
fuels. In several countries, financial instruments are used to promote the adoption of 
small scale solar PV and wind. And although the Netherlands cannot be considered a 
forerunner as compared to countries like Germany, Denmark or France, even here large 
scale innovations seem unthinkable without specific government interventions in favor 
of certain technological trajectories.  
Interventions that affect the market potential of specific technologies are vulnerable for 
critique as they articulate choices that are often hidden and not publicly debated. Even 
interventions that are presented as being of a more generic nature, are not free from 
technological bias. Legitimate questions do arise, such as: Why focus on targets for the 
adoption of biofuels instead of low emission transport fuels in general, including bio-
fuels, natural gas and hydrogen? Why focus on further strengthening construction  
standards for new buildings instead of developing policies and standards that allow for 
combining demand and supply options for the new as well as for the existing dwellings 
supply? How do we know that a European emissions trading regime will positively  
affect the speed of innovations? It would make equal sense to hypothesize that such an 
institutional device will provide a strong incentive to implement the cheapest possible 
options for the short term and a disincentive to start making investments for long term 
innovations. To what extent are subsidies to foster the share of renewables in the  
electricity supply an adequate instrument to trigger a development directed at competi-
tiveness of solar? Why not start from the hypothesis that protective subsidies will  
provoke a climate of slag in this innovation area?  
These and other questions have in common that they may lead to contradictory hypo-
theses, which may point into different policy directions: As yet, we don‟t have answers 
to all questions available. We even don‟t know what the right questions are. In some cas-
es, generic policies may be preferable, in other it may be wise to heavily support a spe-
cific innovation trajectory for a longer period of time. But whatever choices are being 
made, they are always likely to have an impact on the possibilities and the directions of 
technological change. This report will not convey the message that there is anything 
wrong with making choices. Choices are unavoidable.  
Why then is it that energy transition discourse seems not really interested in exploring 
the relationship between the technological and the political? One likely answer to this 
question is the nature of the problem. If one could reasonably expect that investigating 
how institutional arrangements affect technology and vice versa, might lead to a multi-
tude of contradictory questions, hypotheses and political alternatives, some of these 
pointing in the direction of specific technology support and others to more generic inter-
ventions, what would justify to open Pandora‟s box? Why starting a seemingly endless 
debate on the interests related to specific sectors and technological regimes if the alterna-
tive would be to „manage‟ the transition in a much smoother way, that is without any 
such debate at all? Would it not be the highest achievement of politics to organize itself 
into the margin of the energy transition, thereby leaving technological choices to  
coalitions of transition actors and, in last instance, to the market?   
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There are two good reasons for at least exploring some of the alternatives for what we 
consider the anti-political bias in energy transition discourse. The first relates to the 
sense of urgency with respect to the socio-economic and environmental problems that 
must be tackled. If climate changes will evolve as many scientists expect, the global 
community may face increasing conflicts of liability and burden sharing among nations, 
regions and economic sectors. The sense of urgency may go up, leading to more  
stringent international commitments and policies. For countries such as the Netherlands, 
the costs for substantially reducing emissions may strongly depend on the degree the 
country has fully used its potential to realize technological break-throughs. Hence, the 
question is justified as to whether and under what conditions a specific strategy of  
governance fosters innovation? If a governance strategy, which neglects to take into  
account the technological implications of political choice, would yield a preference for 
the options that are cheapest on the short term, Dutch future economy may have to pay a 
price for political conservatism. The second reason has to do with considerations of both 
political rationality and academic curiosity: If the alternatives are available, why not  
explore them? Political history has shown a variation of governance strategies for  
catching up with technological progress. If there is anything these examples show it is 
that there has never been a market without government. Political rationality, as the  
concept has been defined by political scientists, cannot be confused with or restricted to 
defining process architecture. Political interventions articulate process as well as  
substance, in fact one cannot think of any political substance without a process shaped 
by it. To separate process from substance is to end up with nothing.  
The aim of our study can now be defined as to explore what considerations, apart from 
technical feasibility, efficiency and social support may be relevant for governing the 
transition to a sustainable energy system. It is not the aim of this study to build a  
coherent policy framework. Instead, we think it more useful to explore different lines of 
argument that can be used to build a case for or to reject alternate courses of action. As 
we focus on the contribution that political science can make to the development of  
integrated knowledge on the energy transition, the study will focus on considerations  
derived from political theory and hypothesize how these political considerations may  
affect the potential of different technological paths. We hope that this exploration may 
somewhat broaden the scope of transition discourse and trigger the imagination of those 
involved in setting the policy and research agendas for sustainable energy.  
This report is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 provides information on the 
scope and approach taken in this exploratory study. This chapter defines the general  
research problem, three research objectives and information on methodology. Chapter 3 
reports on institutional characteristics found salient for a number of more or less  
promising energy technologies. Chapters 4 – 7 present four paradigms of governance  
derived from political theories and links these to the findings presented in Chapter 3. We 
distinguish the traditional paradigm „Governance by Government‟ (Chapter 4), the 
(post)modern „Governance by policy networking‟ (Chapter 5), „Governance by corporate 
business‟, largely inspired by Schumpeter‟s work on business cycles and technological 
change (Chapter 6) and „Governance by challenge‟, inspired by a heterogeneous group 
of liberal and critical theorists (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 discusses how these paradigms  
relate to topics identified in the current stakeholder debate in the Netherlands. 
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2. Articulating paradigms of governance: scope and 
approach 
This project explores the contribution that political theory can make to our understanding 
of what we refer to as „paradigms for governing technological innovation‟. The overall 
problem definition of the study is:  
How can political theories, especially theories that –both in a normative and an 
empirical sense- reflect upon the nature, characteristics and advancement of  
different types of democracies, contribute to our understanding of the prospects 
for a sustainable energy future?  
This research problem is laid out into three objectives: 
1. To identify institutional variables that may be critical for the potential of sustainable 
energy options; 
2. To articulate paradigms of governance for technological innovation that articulate 
the institutional variables; 
3. To identify issues and questions for the policy and research agendas.  
The primary objective is to show that the focus of the exploration, i.e. that there is a  
relationship between the potential for technological trajectories and political institutions, 
matters in that it shapes the course of the energy transition. This is why in Chapter 3 this 
study explores specific institutional characteristics of competing technological options. 
In this chapter we use an inductive „bottom up‟ approach. 
The second objective of the project is to explore the relationships between these specific 
institutional characteristics and paradigms of governance from political theories. These 
paradigms may neither be mutually exclusive, nor do they (completely) match with the 
actual „theories in use‟ that are found in the current energy transition discourse. The  
purpose of the exercise is not so much to reflect actual positions but rather to highlight 
paradigms that may be used to critically reflect on the current state of the debate.  
The political theories we have used for this exercise share two characteristics that can 
make them look a bit odd to the readers who are not that familiar with theories from this 
discipline. Theories drawn from political and legal philosophies are particularly  
normative in character (e.g. the writings by J.S. Mill). Such theories articulate arguments 
about issues such as: What must be the limits of government vis-à-vis the individual 
rights of citizens? Is a participatory democracy better than one which is merely built on 
representation? Theories that are meant to be tested in empirical research may have  
normative implications too (such as the work by the Dutch political scientist A. Lijphart 
on so-called majoritarian and consensus democracies (e.g. Lijphart, 1999)). Then, there 
is a category of theories, which are built around a „what if‟ assumption. The most famous 
examples depart from the assumption of economic rationality, M. Olson‟s work on the 
logic of collective action (Olson, 1971). All political theories do explicitly or implicitly 
deal with issues of political power and how a certain distribution of power between 
groups and individuals might be legitimated. 
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Obviously, an exploratory study like this one can only cover a very modest sample of the 
work that can be labeled as political theory. For the purpose of this project, theories were 
selected on the following grounds:  
1. The theories have something to say on innovation; including the dissemination and 
use of knowledge;  
2. Given the political-economics character of the subject, theories should articulate a 
view on the relation between state and market (theories not necessarily deal with the 
energy question, but their implications are found to be relevant); 
3. Given the current trends toward liberalization and individuality, theories must  
specify the relation between state and individual; 
4. A pragmatic consideration: the research group must be reasonably familiar with the 
theories under investigation. 
From the start, we left out the international relations dimension, not because it would be 
unimportant, but by adding a new level of analysis it might complicate the exploratory 
exercise. The project‟s scope is basically the (nation) state level.  
Following the broad range of literature on the articulation of policy argument, a  
paradigm is understood as a set of assumptions with respect to a certain policy problem, 
i.e. a problem which is supposed to require some sort of collective action. A paradigm of 
governance articulates a consistent line of argument, which includes causes and effects, 
goals and means, problems and solutions. In the chapters below, we try to present the 
different paradigms as much as possible in a similar way.  
The linking of the political analysis to technologies or technology pathways makes this 
study a joint social and natural sciences undertaking. As a first step, the project team  
developed an analytical framework to link the political science and the technological  
literature (see Appendix 1). The framework was first used to analyze a number of energy 
technologies that are considered to be highly potential for the sectors industry, transport 
and households.  
The third objective is to identify a set of questions for an interdisciplinary research and 
policy agenda which intends to seriously explore the interconnectedness of political, 
economic and energy technological variables characteristic for the energy system. For 
this objective, the report discusses the possible relevance of the respective paradigms 
with respect to current stakeholder discussions in the Netherlands. 
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3. Some institutional characteristics of energy 
technologies 
First we explore as to how different sustainable energy options are characterized by  
specific institutional variables. 
The project looked into some energy options that are widely considered fit to  
substantially reduce CO2 emissions in the Dutch Housing and Construction sector and 
the Transport sector.3 For the stationary sector, it looked into three supply side options, 
i.e. (1) all electric, (2) H2 trajectories and (3) synthetic gas and then it looked into  
(4) demand management. For the mobile sector, it looked into (5) the fuel cells concept.  
The choice to explore these options and not others may look somewhat arbitrary.  
However, given the exploratory character of this study, we consider the number and  
diversity of options sufficient for the purpose of the analysis. The main question  
addressed for these technologies does not relate to their technical and economic  
feasibility, which may vary, but is to see as to whether the options put forward have  
institutional requirements, which may (also) be relevant to distinguish paradigms of  
governance derived from political theories. This chapter first briefly describes the main 
technological characteristics of the options and then goes into their salience in terms of 
institutions. 
3.1 Options 
3.1.1 All electric 
The all electric option is defined here by the production of low value heat using  
underground water storage and circulating the water through heat pumps. Electricity is 
centrally produced using natural gas and removal and underground storage of CO 2. As a 
variant, electricity may also be produced locally by renewables, e.g. solar PV or wind. 
This option is yet in an experimental stage for households, but for utility buildings it may 
already compete with conventional heating (and cooling) techniques. A technical  
requirement is insulation of the dwelling up to recent standards. Note that for this option, 
the dwelling is not anymore connected to the gas grid. In case of decentralized produc-
tion, the surplus of electricity is either delivered to the grid or converted into hydrogen.  
3.1.2 Hydrogen (stationary) 
Hydrogen is centrally produced from natural gas, syngas or coal. The central infrastruc-
ture makes it possible to remove CO2 and store it underground. It is brought to the  
                                                   
3
  This chapter is largely based on H. Jeeninga, Energie infrastructuur in de Gebouwde  
Omgeving, Vraagbeperking en Brandstofcellen in vervoer. (ECN Beleidsstudies, 2003). This 
is an internal working document written in the context of this project. It is further based on 
Back Casting exercises from the COOL project (Hisschemöller and Van de Kerkhof, 2000) 
and some preliminary findings form the current project Governing the Transition to a  
sustainable Hydrogen Economy (Hisschemöller and Bode, 2004).  
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dwelling through a central (natural gas or hydrogen infrastructure). Here, it is converted 
into heat and electricity by a micro-CHP installation. For this option, the electricity grid 
may not be needed anymore except perhaps for storing an electricity surplus.  
3.1.3 Syngas 
Syngas as the option is defined here, is gas produced through conversion of biomass. 
This option has the same characteristics as „normal‟ natural gas in that it may use the 
same infrastructure. It can be mixed with natural gas. The currently available storage  
capacity for natural gas can also be used for syngas. Factors that may affect the  
sustainability of this option are a large scale supply of biomass for energy purposes (no 
competition with food production) and the actual possibilities to avoid the emission of 
other pollutants than CO2.  
3.1.4 Demand management 
In conformity with the trias energetica one would first have to decrease energy demand, 
then use as much as possible renewables for energy supply and finally be as efficient as 
possible in using fossil fuels for the remaining part of supply. Demand management  
relates to the insulation of dwellings, i.e. walls, roof, floor and windows. A characteristic 
of this option is that measures are semi permanent; they will not be easily removed if 
better options become available. Demand management has to compete with less perma-
nent supply options (HR or micro CHP systems). Consumers may be tempted to make 
short term investments in supply options and neglect demand management. At the same 
time, demand side management may be a necessary requirement for the successful  
implementation of innovative (low value heat) supply options.  
3.1.5 Fuel cells in transport 
The transportation sector is significant as it shows the highest increase in CO2 emissions 
in the Netherlands. Vehicle improvements are outweighed by a sharp increase in vehicle 
use. It is expected that even future improvements of the engine combined with modal 
shift (e.g. commodity transport over water) will be insufficient to stop the increase in 
emissions. Hence, a shift to zero / low emission transport fuels appears a necessary  
precondition for a reversal of the up going trend. Next to biofuels, hydrogen is one of the 
alternatives seriously considered by the EU.  
Through a fuel cell H2 is converted into electricity and heat. The vehicle will probably 
have an electric engine, but it is also possible to use hydrogen purely or mixed with other 
traditional fuels in an internal combustion engine. The hydrogen can be obtained at the 
gas station, like in the current (reference) situation. Hydrogen transport vehicles are still 
in an experimental stage. Much more experience has been gained with biofuels (such as 
ethanol or biodiesel). However, experience with hydrogen is rapidly growing. Instead of 
fuelling at the gas station, there is also an opportunity for home fuelling (link with option 
1).  
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3.2 Institutional variables 
There is much to say about the technological conditions and the costs of these options, as 
some look more feasible than others. If looked at from an institutional perspective, the 
following variables appear critical: The first variable relates to the question as to whether 
there is a strategic interest involved, such as an interest of national security or an interest 
that may otherwise relate to political stability. Strategic interests may urge for a specific 
kind of governance, because the protection of so-called collective goods is usually  
considered as one of the major functions of the (national) state. The most vital interest 
with respect to the stability of the energy system is considered security of supply.  
Therefore, we refer to this interest in particular. But other (social) interests may be 
thought of as well. Secondly, the question to be asked here is as to whether the option 
can be seen as a collective or a private good. Theoretically speaking, this dimension,  
referred to as collective-private overlaps with the „strategic interest‟ topic, but here we 
refer to characteristics of the option with respect to infrastructure. In case of a collective 
good, implementing the option means that, basically, no one can be excluded from using 
it once it is available. So, in the Netherlands everyone can obtain natural gas, except for 
the small minority who is not connected to the gas infrastructure. In case of a private 
good, the option can be realized in individual cases without consequences for other  
individual cases or the entire system. So, an individual household or company may 
choose to go for a small scale self supporting energy system. As long as these cases  
remain limited in number, they will hardly affect the entire system. Apart from this  
collective-private variable, three other variables are considered salient from an  
institutional point of view, i.e. centralized-decentralized production, consumer  
sovereignty and externalization.    
The findings from our analysis are summarized in Table 3.1 below. The plusses and  
minuses are based on the following considerations.  
3.2.1 Security of supply 
 The all electric option may contribute to security of supply, if, next to the central 
production of electricity:  
(1) Sufficient electricity is decentrally produced by a range of energy carriers  
including renewables and (2) the decentrally produced electricity can be transported 
elsewhere through a central grid. As will be discussed below, the consequences of 
the decentralized variant are far reaching; 
 If hydrogen is centrally produced, which is assumed for this option in the  
Netherlands this will probably happen through natural gas. As hydrogen will replace 
the use of electricity it may be expected that the demand for natural gas will  
considerably go up. Today, the really big natural gas producing countries are not 
(yet) considered that reliable, which makes security of supply questionable. Only if, 
next to natural gas and biomass (see next), hydrogen producers will use coal and  
nuclear (or in addition wind), this option may contribute to security of supply; 
 For the production of Syngas the Netherlands have to rely upon large scale biomass 
imports. As yet, it is not known as to whether such large scale biomass supply will be 
available over a longer period of time. Hence, this option may suffer from insecurity 
of supply; 
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 Demand management is supposed to contribute to security of supply in that it  
diminishes the use of scarce resources; 
 Fuel cells for the transport sector will use hydrogen from natural gas or biomass or 
other sources. On the one hand, we might conclude the same as for hydrogen and 
syngas, which is that there will be a huge demand for potentially scarce fuels, but on 
the other, it might be concluded that the dependency on oil will go down, which is 
favorable for of security of supply. Given the reference situation, dependency on oil, 
we suppose that in this particular case there is more to say for the argument that  
security of supply may benefit from fuel cells in transport. 
Apart from security of supply there may be other strategic interests, such as employment 
in existing energy related industries (refineries).  
3.2.2 Collective – private and consumer sovereignty 
 The all electric option is a collective good in that it will require a large extension of 
grid capacity. This will take an expensive endeavor, which may be in part compen-
sated by the fact that the natural gas grid becomes redundant. In case of decentralized 
production, raising the grid capacity will also be needed if a surplus goes back to the 
grid. But consumers may also go for hydrogen. Consumer choice is limited but not 
absent. A mix of centralized and decentralized options are available; 
 If hydrogen is centrally produced, the infrastructure makes it a collective good even 
if the H2 is produced in different ways by a variety of producers. Experts expect that 
the existing natural gas infrastructure is unfit for the transport of pure hydrogen. It is 
likely that the existing gas infrastructure should be modified or even replaced. This 
may require a huge collective effort at national level, even more so than in the all 
electric option. We expect consumer sovereignty to be minimal in this option; 
 For syngas the national infrastructure is available, but its maintenance and renovation 
are only feasible if a large majority of consumers uses gas; 
 The option demand management may be considered to address a collective good but 
in practice, decisions are left to consumers or house owners. Obviously, owners of 
existing dwellings have most freedom in deciding upon insulation measures. Even if 
national or EU regulation is extended, this is likely to remain; 
 Normally fuel cells for the transport sector are considered a private good. Consumers 
are free to decide on their means of transport, people can switch from one transport 
fuel to another and the producers are responsible for infrastructure. Consumers are 
not in any moral sense entitled to private transport. However, as recent upheavals in 
EU countries around gasoline prices indicate, there might be a public perception that 
availability and pricing cannot be left to the market. 
3.2.3 Centralized – decentralized 
This dimension largely overlaps with the former one because options that represent a 
collective good in terms of infrastructure requirements are normally produced and  
distributed centrally. However, private goods may be produced and distributed either  
decentrally (demand management), centrally (transport fuels) or both. In case of the  
all electric option, the low value heat and electricity can come either from the grid or can 
be produced by decentralized renewables, often owned by their users.  
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3.2.4 Externalization 
As political institutions may serve to address problems of externalizing the costs of  
collective goods, which has also been referred to as „free riding‟, we thought it useful to 
explore as to whether (large scale) implementation of the options under consideration 
may externalize social costs. For neither the options stationary H2 trajectory, demand 
management, nor the fuel cells for transport vehicles we find significant externalization 
impacts, although we realize that choices with respect to infrastructure may drastically 
shape the opportunities for next generations. Because of the doubts as to whether the 
growing of energy crops world wide will compete with food production or distort natural 
protection, the large scale production of syngas for the domestic and industrial sector or, 
for that matter, biofuels for the transportation sector may run the risk of externalization.  
It appears that especially for the option all electric the externalization effects may  
become critical, if consumer preferences shift from centralized to decentralized produc-
tion. Basically, a single consumer‟s decision to become his own electricity producer may 
not have any consequences for others. However, this may become different once a large 
number of consumers would choose for the benefits of this option. As mentioned before, 
a significant share of electricity production by decentralized units may contribute to the 
collective good of security of supply. It should be noticed that this is only the case if a 
surplus of electricity can become available to all through the grid or another accessible 
store. The more people voluntarily choose for this option (assuming that it becomes  
attractive to them at a certain point in time), the more vulnerable the collective good  
infrastructure will become. On a warm day, decentralized production of electricity using 
solar PV may lead to a huge under capacity of the national grid. In response, the capacity 
of the electricity grid might be considerably extended or the electricity-surplus might be 
converted into hydrogen, in which case there should be some collective hydrogen  
infrastructure (option 2).  
Apart from the considerable costs for infrastructure, an increased popularity of the  
all electric option in combination with decentralized production and conversion into  
hydrogen may bring serious difficulties to energy companies. The sales of centrally  
produced electricity may go down and this may also happen to natural gas and other  
energy carriers used for centralized electricity production. Even the producers of  
transport fuels may be affected, if domestically produced hydrogen is increasingly used 
for car fuelling. Hence, the vested interests in the energy system, those who are respon-
sible for system‟s stability but also for the status quo, might all be negatively affected 
when through all electric a decentralized production of electricity and hydrogen would 
gain a considerable market share.  
It might be possible that one of the major energy companies takes the initiative to  
embrace the decentralized variant by selling or leasing equipment to consumers. But 
even then, this option remains a potential threat to the stability of the system and for go-
verning the system, because it will be extremely difficult to decide when infrastructural 
measures should be taken and how the costs must be shared. Hence, this option puts 
some interesting challenges to governance, as such a development may require  
something like a flexible response. 
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Table 3.1 Five energy options and their possible institutional implications. 
 All electric H2 stationary Syngas Demand Fuel cells 
transport 
Security Yes 
Multiple sources 
No  
1 source 
No 
1 source 
Yes Yes 
Coll-priv* Yes Yes Yes No No 
Centr-dec* Both Yes Yes No Yes 
Consumers Yes No No Yes Yes 
External Yes 
If increase  
decentral 
No Yes 
If large scale 
imports 
No No 
* + refers to the first concept in the dichotomy. 
 
What can be learned from this tentative exploration of institutional implications of  
energy options?  
 The first observation relates to the major consequences most options have for  
infrastructure. A choice for one specific infrastructure, e.g. an electricity, gas or  
hydrogen infrastructure may prevent an other option to develop. Given the scale of 
such a project and its costs, infrastructure choice requires a huge government  
involvement;  
 The second observation is that some options have a head start in terms of infrastruc-
tural conditions. Fuel cells for transport may fit in quite nicely with the existing  
private fuelling infrastructure, although major investments may be required. Syngas 
requires good maintenance of existing national gas infrastructure, the central produc-
tion and distribution of hydrogen requires to quite drastically adjust the natural gas 
infrastructure or even to create a complete new infrastructure. The option demand 
management is different from these three options in that it is not so much dependant 
on infrastructure, but in a sense creates infrastructure in all kinds of options that use 
low value heat (all electric option). All electric seems a very complex option in this 
respect. Central production will require major investments in grid extension.  
However, when decentralized production gains in popularity and very many  
(potential) consumer-producers get involved, other investments may be required; 
 If we look at the implications for governance from the perspective of infrastructure 
costs in the long run, we may hypothesize that the lower infrastructure costs, the 
more generic policies will suffice, but the higher infrastructure costs, the more  
specific policies will come to be. Non-decisions at the political level will benefit  
options that can rely upon available infrastructure or private willingness to invest. 
Private willingness to invest will increase as the benefits of the investment return to 
the investor and do not leak to free riders, which may especially be an issue in case 
of large scale infrastructures; 
 The analysis shows that almost all options are linked up with specific vested  
interests, but that certain options may exclude one another. Government choices are 
unavoidable. Where vested interests are not involved or may even be threatened, as 
in the cases of demand management and decentralized all electric, vested interests 
may be(come) resistant; 
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 The observations so far only take into account the strategic interests related to  
infrastructure. If we broaden the scope to security of supply, the picture gets more  
complex especially where the long term is concerned. Options that may be beneficial 
to security of supply seem to be much less linked to vested interests in the energy 
system than options that are risky in this respect, i.e. options that heavily rely upon 
large scale natural gas or biomass (syngas).  
We would not endorse any claim as if this conclusion were supported by a thorough  
scientific investigation, but this is not the aim of this chapter and, at this stage, there is 
no need to make such claim. What we can conclude, however, is that our exploration 
yields legitimate hypotheses. These are worth investigating, especially because they  
contradict some major hypotheses common in transition discourse, i.e. that government 
does not need to choose in order to make the market work and stimulate innovation. 
More importantly, however, is that this chapter shows that, next to costs and social  
support, the competitiveness of long term energy options will be very much dependant 
on the governance strategy in place. 
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4. Governance by government 
This paradigm claims that government should do what citizens or private actors cannot, 
which is to safeguard the public interest. In a democracy, the acts of government should 
be visible for the public at large, so that policy effectiveness can be evaluated by the 
electorate. Basically, a government has all means at its disposal within the rule of law.  
Governance by government is based on two types of theories, which is reflected in a dual 
claim:  
1. Private actors will not voluntarily adjust their behavior as to realize a public good. 
This statement can be elaborated and justified using economic theories of policy, 
politics and organization (e.g. Olson, 1971);  
2. It is at the heart of (representative) democracy that public affairs are dealt with by an 
accountable public agent. This statement will be elaborated and justified using  
theories on representative democracy (e.g. Ezrahi, 1990). 
Olson developed his logic of collective action as a critique on so-called group theory 
(Bentley, 1908), a radical orientation within American pluralist theory. The basic  
assumption in American pluralist theory is that groups organize themselves to volunta-
rily promote a collective good, such as „good education‟ or „a clean environment‟. Each 
interest is, to some extent, represented within the political elite. Depending on the issue 
at hand, interest groups try to form majority coalitions. Given the overlap between 
groups and the variation of political issues over time, pluralist democracy offers a fair 
chance for all citizens to get something out of the political process. No group is  
completely excluded from participation and political power.  
Olson rejected the assumption that people will voluntarily join in defense of a collective 
good (i.e. a group‟s interest). This is not because people are selfish. Also an altruist  
person would not act in favor of a collective good, if he makes a rational judgment.  
Olson explains this by pointing to the fact that the investments needed are not worth-
while, “since his own contribution would not be perceptible” (1971: 64). After all, you 
never know as to whether others would make a similar effort for the public good. The 
social isolation of individuals makes them hesitant to act, especially when the group and 
its interest is large. As one of the characteristics of a collective good is that, once it has 
been realized, no one can basically be excluded from using it, the most rational (in an 
economic sense of the word) behavior is to take a so-called „free-ride‟, in other words, 
externalize the individual costs that need to be made for maintaining the collective good.  
Indeed, there are circumstances which allow small groups or private parties to realize a 
public good. In this kind of situation, the cost-benefit ratio justifies action in the collec-
tive interest. We might think of so-called NIMBY (Not In MY Back-Yard) situations, 
where local groups (who do not suffer that much from individual isolation) are able to 
successfully resist unwanted facilities like nuclear power stations, thereby safeguarding 
locally collective goods such as a clean environment or a beautiful landscape. But in 
NIMBY cases, a small group has a much stronger interest to resist a collective good 
(such as an energy facility) than the community as a whole (all electricity consumers in a 
country or region) has to enforce it.  
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So, what Olson shows is the existence of what has been labeled social dilemmas, i.e.  
discrepancies between collective and individual interest.
4
 The larger the public interest, 
the more it is vulnerable to suffering from free-riders who have a particular interest in 
harming the collective good. “There are multitudes with an interest in peace, but they 
have no lobby to match those of the „special interests‟ that may on occasion have an  
interest in war. There are vast numbers who have a common interest in preventing  
inflation and depression, but they have no organizations to express that interest.”  
(Olson, 1971: 166).  
Olson‟s theory can be situated in a long tradition of thinking about the legitimacy of a 
coercive state vis-à-vis its citizens, of which Thomas Hobbes is considered one of the 
founding fathers. There is evidence to endorse that citizens are aware of the existence of 
social dilemmas and therefore tend to support government policies that make them  
behave in a way they would not voluntarily do. In exchange, citizens must be able to 
trust some basic qualities of the policy-making system: in particular, the benefits of  
government interventions should become visible for them. This is a necessary  
prerequisite for citizens to hold government accountable for its interventions.  
Ezrahi (1990) stresses the role of the citizen as a capable witness in democratic politics 
(American politics being his main example), giving „acte de presence‟ to actively  
observe real life experiments of social engineering. Science and technology are crucial in 
assisting democratic politics, especially since they help to depersonalize political acts 
and give them an instrumental meaning as a means to realize an end. What Ezrahi  
considers especially important is that democratic politics make it possible “to externalize 
the invisible, inward domain of motives in a visible domain of observable, knowable,  
rationally reconstructable actions and to subordinate the credibility of words and  
arguments to the apparently more public and objective tests of deeds and actions”  
(Ezrahi, 1990: 38). In this view, government acts, takes the initiative, experiments and, 
through trial and error and with the help of science and technology, works to realize an 
improvement of society. The analogy between governance and science as experiments is 
taken further. The citizen becomes an active lay-witness, like laypersons were invited to 
attend scientific experiments in the 17th and 18th century. Science may develop into what 
Lasswell (1951) has labeled the policy sciences of democracy, which was designed to 
assist policy-makers in addressing the major social problems of their time, poverty,  
unemployment, racism and education. In this vision of democratic governance, what  
citizens evaluate is not so much political rhetoric. What counts in the end is as to wheth-
er policies have worked in practice.   
In order to realize a public good, the number of means, interventions and instruments 
that government has at its disposal is basically unlimited within the rule of law.  
Government may invent rules and regulations, raise taxes, create markets or close down 
factories. In case of innovation policy, it may establish generic policies but also support 
specific technologies; it may even perform as an entrepreneur. On one condition: the  
policy goal should be achieved and, in a democratic society, the public at large should 
have the opportunity to evaluate policy effectiveness.  
                                                   
4
  But also compare metaphors such as „the tragedy of the commons‟ (Hardin, 1968) or the 
„prisoners dilemma‟ (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
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Ezrahi and others (e.g. Price, 1965; Castells, 1996) point to the experience with a rather 
extreme strategy of innovation, which can be fully justified by reference to the paradigm 
Governance by Government. This strategy (about the 1940s – 1960s) focused on the 
American aerospace and national defense sectors as niches for technological innovation. 
Huge funds were spent in national research labs and for the production of weapons. In 
fact, these sectors actually functioned as niches for the development and testing of new 
technologies. The strategy, labeled as „governance by contract‟, served several functions 
at the same time: Firstly, the public-private collaboration served to develop, test and  
implement specific technical innovations, whereby government acted as what may be  
referred to as an „early mover‟. This innovation strategy was justified by the size of the 
costs and risks of the innovations, a risk no private actor could bear on its own. The 
strategy contributed to national prosperity and employment. But there was also another, 
more symbolic function: Through the involvement of private parties, they became  
integrated “as agents of public actions” (Ezrahi, 1990: 43). The private firms that  
contributed to the public cause in the US became to symbolize the collective action of 
the American people. So, „governance by contract‟ was legitimized by an appeal to a 
strategic (national) interest and -simultaneously- created the conditions for people to feel 
involved.  
As this innovation strategy shows, Governance by Government may, in spite of the  
liberal rhetoric of a free market system, focus on policies aimed at specific technology 
development and support. At that time there were two conditions that made the system 
work. The first was a successful appeal to an overriding collective good, security. This 
compelling national interest made it possible to bring to bear a seemingly unlimited 
amount of resources. The distribution of these resources among the private sector was 
based on no other considerations but one, i.e. to obtain given objectives. Policy was  
neither evaluated in terms of efficiency nor in terms of the quality of its underlying  
procedures. The policies shaped by „Governance by Government‟ can be best  
characterized in terms of what Lowi (1972) labels „distributive‟ policy. In this type of 
policy making, there is one actor which has so much power that it can make decisions 
without consulting other actors. The actor in power may itself establish the rules of  
reward and punishment and may itself choose to (re)allocate scarce resources. Given the 
power structure and its reward system, opposition against political decisions is very  
difficult.  
The second condition for making this system work was linked to the first. Ezrahi stresses 
that the general perception of science and technology being impartial and objective 
helped to maintain the integrity of the system. Representational democracy is based on a 
dual objective, on the one hand to depersonalize political power and make it a „neutral‟ 
instrument in obtaining political goals, while on the other hand to enhance and maintain 
a situation in which political actors can be held accountable and responsible for their  
actions.  
For an understanding of the limitations of Governance by Government as a theoretical 
paradigm it is essential to note that a large consensus is a prerogative for any strategy 
that explicitly or implicitly draws upon it. Consensus relates on the one hand to the  
public goods (values) to be protected and on the other to the objective knowledge base 
available in support of specific actions. In a not that often quoted paragraph, Olson is the 
first to acknowledge that his theory on collective goods underlies this unrealistic  
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assumption of full consensus: “But the results obtained under this assumption are, for 
that reason, all the stronger, for if voluntary, rational action cannot enable a large, latent 
group to organize for action to achieve its collective goals, even with perfect consensus, 
then a fortiori this conclusion should hold in the real world, where consensus is usually 
incomplete and often altogether absent.” (Olson, 1971: 60) And he adds a warning for 
those who too eagerly may want to apply his theory with respect to state interventions in 
practice: “It is thus very important to distinguish between the obstacles to group-oriented 
action that are due to a lack of group consensus and those that are due to a lack of  
individual consensus.” In other words, coercion by government policies may only work 
if the citizens agree on the value and relevance of the public good under consideration.  
Many have acknowledged the changing role of science and expertise in democratic  
societies. Rather than a means to impartially solve social problems, scientific knowledge 
has become contested and debated, especially where new technologies and their potential 
risks are at stake. The world wide controversy on the risks of nuclear power belongs to 
the most cited examples. The nuclear power debate had implications that go far beyond 
the area of technology policy. It has strongly contributed to a retreat of government in its 
capacity to support specific technologies. It has led to reconsider the relevance of public 
participation. And it has shaped a more critical attitude with respect to the often  
privileged position of expert networks in decision-making, giving more attention to  
so-called practical or lay knowledge.    
Notwithstanding its built-in limitations, it may be too early to state that for Governance 
by Government the book is closed. In case of a shared awareness and a high sense of  
urgency, governments may deviate from their course of liberalization and privatization 
and take the transition of the energy system more in their own hands. The paradigm Go-
vernance by Government would be specifically fit to manage a collaborative attempt to 
implement energy technologies which require huge infrastructure investments and  
major potential environmental risks. Also today, its appeal to public as well as private 
actors is the promise that collective action, a joint effort to invest as „early mover‟ in a 
pre-competitive stage, may be effective in realizing a transition path to a sustainable  
energy system.  
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5. Governance by Policy Networking 
This paradigm claims that the traditional instruments of the state to control and shape  
society do not work anymore. The power of the traditional nation state is weakening.  
Instead of enforcing its will on society, the state may govern together with private actors 
to jointly realize the public interest. Therefore, government facilitates the formation and 
maintenance of policy networks consisting of socio-economic actors. These networks are 
supposed to have the knowledge, the power and the inclination to foster some public  
interest, including the transition to a sustainable energy system.  
In the Netherlands this paradigm appears to be dominant. It is defended by a great  
number of policy scientists. Generally speaking, the assumptions that underlie this  
paradigm of Governance by Policy networking can be summarized as follows:  
 There is a shift from „government‟ to „governance‟. Whereas „government‟ refers to 
a monocentric interventionist perspective, the idea of governance refers to a polycen-
tric model, which envisions concerted actions by decentralized actors, each of which 
has only limited coercive capacity;  
 Multi-layered governance
5
 refers to the way policy making at different levels (local, 
national, European, global) has become intertwined. From a normative perspective, 
this concept refers to the need for better coordination and collaboration between  
different levels of governance, given its bad track record, which comes out from 
many studies on „implementation‟; 
 A third element in the concept of governance is the idea that, next to governments, 
stakeholders from „civil society‟, especially the business communities and the  
environmental and consumer NGOs (have to) become partners in governing. There 
                                                   
5
  The term “multi-layered” is here being used to in the sense of the French historiographical 
school, e.g. Braudel (1979). Present states of affairs are seen as resulting from different and 
stapled historical processes of different tempi, (longue durée, histoire conjuncturelle, histoire 
evénémentielle). Cox (1995) calls them “historical structures”. In some fields, like law, it is 
easy to see that some “layers” nearly disappear, others are being overgrown by new layers, 
and others coexist. Governmental institutions can also be considered historically grown,  
layered historical structures.  
 Multilevel governance is related to that concept in the sense, that governance can be seen as 
being exerted on different levels (local, Geländer, national, European, global), working  
together, but also with tensions and counter to one another. But the term multi-level  
governance is just an institutional denominator, which can lead to overlooking the histori-
cally different developments that go behind those levels. The interrelatedness and dynamics 
between “local”, “national”, “European” and global levels differ greatly due to historical  
reasons between e.a. the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France or Spain.  
 Related but not identical to multilevel governance in the sense of cooperation and/or coordi-
nation between institutional government levels is the use of a multilevel model within a  
systems approach of technological innovation, called transition management (e.g. Rotmans, 
Kemp, Arentsen). In this approach a three level model is being used: niche level, a regime 
level and a landscape level. (similar as micro, meso and macro levels). And multilevel  
governance of system innovation processes, managing transitions, is then managing the  
dynamics between these levels (Rotmans, 2003: 63). 
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have always been critical sociologists and political scientists who have studied  
participation as related to the exercise of power, e.g. of the (international) business 
community. However, what is new in the current situation is the notion that partici-
pation can be part of a smooth management process rather than a struggle for power. 
Participation is considered necessary for good governance because, in the case of 
complex (unstructured) problems, the traditional instruments of top-down regulation 
are supposed not to work anymore. The idea of „governance by networking‟ may be 
especially strong in The Netherlands (e.g. De Bruin and Ten Heuvelhof, 1999;  
Glasbergen, 2000). with its traditions of enlightened corporatism (polder model) but 
this is an international trend as well. Participation becomes associated with  
co-production rather than with opposition and with workshops rather than with  
public hearings. This is observable in national policy making as well as in  
international environmental negotiations; 
 One of the main factors responsible for the participatory trend in environmental  
policy is the changing role of science and expertise. The status and privilege of  
scientific knowledge has declined and is likely to decline further, as (environmental) 
problems are conceived of as increasingly complex. It is widely recognized that 
problems are not objective givens and values cannot be separated from facts. The last 
decades have shown a growing interest in „lay‟ or „practical‟ (stakeholder)  
knowledge and its relevance for environmental policies. The tensions between the 
need for sound scientific expertise and the contested character of knowledge, have 
contributed to an increasing popularity of participatory approaches in integrated  
environmental assessment (e.g. Hisschemöller, Hoppe, Dunn and Ravetz, 2001); 
 At the level of theory, many policy scientists have noticed a shift from an interest-
based orientation to one based on discourse and social-constructivism. Diverging 
stakeholder views are not so much explained by conflicts of interest, they are  
supposed to originate from conflicting conceptions of reality, held by stakeholders 
who may – apart from other differences - operate at different levels, the global, the 
national and the local. 
Some striking developments during the last decades in energy policy worldwide can  
illustrate the rise of this paradigm in theory and practice. Traditionally, energy policy has 
been in the realm of national government, especially where issues of environmental risk 
are concerned. Until recently, many national governments owned companies with the 
goal to produce and allocate collective goods and services, such as energy. Especially the 
building and exploitation of large infrastructures became a nation state responsibility,  
including the funding and the legal and coercive framework needed to implement and 
maintain the quality of infrastructures and the handling of collective resistance against 
unwanted facilities. In the Netherlands, national government has, in the case of natural 
gas, shared the ownership and exploitation of natural resources, but the import and  
distribution of transport fuels have always been a private activity. In case of the alloca-
tion and protection of collective goods and services that are associated with a national  
interest – in 20th century‟s industrial states energy being a typical example –, political 
systems (states), even the most pluralist ones, have acted as monolithic actors vis-à-vis 
citizens and business. This is also true for The Netherlands, where major decisions  
related to energy policy, such as closing down the coal mines in South-Limburg during 
the 1960s (Moharir, 1979), the transition to natural gas (Correljé and Verbong, 2002) or 
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the decision not to build new nuclear power stations (Hisschemöller and Midden, 1990), 
were based on a political consensus. Open conflict was avoided and where this turned 
out impossible as in the case of nuclear power, it resulted in non-decisions c.q. inaction.  
Although theories on governance are of more recent date, we may like to link this  
concept, and especially its focus on collaboration and consensus, to political theories in 
the corporatist tradition. The Dutch political scientist Lijphart (1967) introduced the  
concept of „accommodation politics‟ in order to capture the Dutch political system as it 
had evolved during the first part of the 20th century (1917-1967). In later publications, 
this type of system has also been labelled the consensus model of democracy in contrast 
to the majoritarian model based on the “winner takes all” principle that underlies the 
electoral system in the United Kingdom. Accommodation politics differs strongly from 
American pluralism in that it applies to a social system which lacks so-called cross-
cutting cleavages (overlapping social interests and groups). The social system is  
dominated by conflicting values if not social segregation. In fact, the social, cultural and 
political landscape in Netherlands was dominated by „pillars‟, representing different  
religions and ideologies. None of these groups could, on itself, build a majority govern-
ment. A competitive pluralist approach would either yield oppression of minorities or the 
political system would fall apart. The democratic method fit for this particular situation 
would be a kind of elite rule based on a compromise among the leaders of the various 
cultural, ethnic or religious groups. This compromise includes several rules of conduct 
that are crucial for the stability of the system, such as the principle of consensus in  
matters of national importance (which implies a de facto veto power for the blocks  
involved), an agreement to disagree in other matters and secrecy vis-à-vis the rank and 
file. One basic characteristic is the low level of participation in this type of democracy. 
Participation may easily lead to polarization and, in case of ethnic or religious conflict, 
the destabilization of the political system or even civil war. So, what makes this model 
differ from other models of democracy, such as the American model as described by  
Ezrahi (1990, see Chapter 4), is the absence of competition among the political elites 
(Huntington, 1981). It is considered a vital interest of the various elites as well as of the 
entire political system that the rank and file takes a somewhat deferent position with  
respect to politics.  
Policy as accommodation may have proven to work in cases of irreconcilable values, 
such as culture, ethnicity or religion, it may also work in other issue areas such as  
environmental risk. Even in case a society is not segregated at all, it may happen that  
environmental conflict tends to polarize because of antagonistic values, like in the cases 
of nuclear power, GMOs or the protection of traditional landscapes and natural areas. 
Conceptions of risk may even be linked to diverging cultures.
6
 The rules of the game in 
this type of policy are (1) to agree that the conflicting values at stake are legitimate and 
may not be harmed, (2) try to seek consensus on what may be considered a means rather 
than policy ends. Means can be understood as all kinds of vehicles that may help to 
move away from a deadlock position, such as the application of certain laws and proce-
                                                   
6
  Whereas Douglas and Wildavsky in their famous Risk and Culture take a Schumpeterian  
position, insisting that dialogue between cultures is a dangerous utopian error, Schwarz and 
Thompson (1990), applying cultural theory inter alia to Dutch environmental policy, argue 
for a dialogue between cultures.  
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dures, the political conception of general policy framework documents that seek at  
integrating competing values (ecology and economy), the setting of environmental stan-
dards, the discussion on and application of policy principles, such as the precautionary 
principle, as well as concepts used to enhance dialogue and to establish a shared  
discourse, such as sustainability, ecological footprint or transition management. Policy 
may become more abstract and symbolic rather than specific. The basic justification is to 
advance a dialogue among parties with strongly divergent views. This may on the one 
hand build trust and help to meliorate antagonistic positions, and on the other create a 
shared framework for understanding the complexities of the situation at hand.  
Governance by Policy Networking may be considered a corollary of Accommodation 
politics especially because of its focus on consensus formation between political actors 
and stakeholders. The Dutch model of environmental agreements between government 
and business have become famous and are considered an example by many international 
scholars. One of the most important agreements, as far as the energy transition is  
concerned, is the benchmarking agreement: Major Dutch corporations have agreed to 
maintain their leading international position in the field of energy efficiency, while in 
exchange Dutch government has promised not to take reduction measures that could be 
harmful for the position of Dutch industry in international competition. This agreement 
does not affect the level of emissions, as in a period of economic prosperity emissions 
can go up in spite of improved energy efficiency. Transition management may also be 
considered to fit in nicely with the Networking paradigm. Consensus on transition goals 
can be considered a means to stimulate the private sector to take its social responsibility 
without specific government regulations. However, behind the scene, the possibility of 
regulation is always there, but the likelihood thereof is not that big, given the shared  
recognition that parties are dependant upon one another in order to move forward.  
Another and most remarkable feature of the policy networking paradigm in practice, is 
the focus on collaboration and, which is the other side of the medal, the lack of competi-
tion. To the extent there is competition between transition views at the political level, the 
controversy is rather symbolic and does not seem to have much bearing on practice, an 
example being debates on (long-term) environmental targets. And although at the level 
of specific solutions „creative competition‟ (Teisman, 1997) may be part of the game, 
Governance by Networking suggests that sharing expertise can lead to the best results 
both for separate companies as for national economy. In the field of energy this seems to 
be confirmed by the very high correlation found between the overall energy-efficiency of 
the economies of 36 democracies and the degree of consensual characteristics of these 
democracies, a correlation that is unaffected by the introduction of the level of economic 
development as a control variable. (Lijphart, 1999, 297).  
However, Governance by Policy Networking may be also vulnerable to the critique that 
it yields conservatism rather than innovation. Some empirical evidence has been  
produced by Eberg (1997) in his comparison of waste policies in the Netherlands and 
Bavaria. More important than scattered empirical evidence, though, is the argument that 
can be derived from political theory itself. The networks to be governed become part and 
parcel of the governance setting itself, in other words; they become institutionalized. Ra-
ther than a means to an end, the networks may become ends in themselves. Hence, the 
networks may be resistant to innovative views and actors. Even an independent actor as 
the Dutch Council for Space, Environment and Nature Research (RMNO) reflects some 
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concern with respect to the input from non-institutionalized actors in the policy  
networks: “For system innovation, not dominant knowledge is important. This implies 
that the configuration of knowledge producers must be different for a transition network 
as compared to already existing (policy) networks. Innovation is impossible without 
new, crosspatch thinking, but this should be restricted in order to yield results.” 
(RMNO, 2003, translation and italic by the authors).  
In the absence of rival views networks may extend and reproduce specific discourses. 
Apart from their important symbolic function, discourse may also perform as an impor-
tant mechanism for inclusion and exclusion. So, it may be hypothesized that Governance 
by Policy Networking may have the unintended effect to prevent what it aims for, i.e. the 
stimulation of technological innovations. In a recent study on the social and political  
implications of the project The Greenhouse as a Source of Energy initiated by the  
Innovation Network and the sector, the first author of this study concludes that perhaps 
the most significant threat for this technological break-through concept may not be lack 
of support in the sector, but a government based discourse which seems to a priori ignore 
the feasibility of this concept for the decade to come (Hisschemöller, Ravensbergen and 
Minnesma, 2003).
7
  
The report states that “doubts with respect to the feasibility of the concept are likely to 
be based on implicit assumptions that go beyond the scope of the technological concept 
itself. Can government support technological innovation in an era of liberalization? 
Then, Dutch energy discourse reflects the view that solar based innovations are still far 
ahead of us” (Hisschemöller, Ravensbergen and Minnesma, 2003: 18). The report  
concludes that, in spite of the political support already there, transition discourse may 
provide serious obstacles for this system innovation. These may effectively be countered 
by lobbying from the sector rather than a transition dialogue.  
To conclude the discussion on this paradigm, it can be said that it has become dominant 
in policy science and policy-making circles in quite some countries including the  
European Union. On the one hand, it is being welcomed as an alternative for top-down 
government and political polarization. It is expected that power sharing may foster the 
sharing of knowledge and hence, technological innovation. On the other hand, questions 
rise with respect to the institutionalization and discursive impact of the networking.  
A compromise oriented approach may neglect rather than enhance opportunities for  
innovation. 
 
                                                   
7
  A key concept in this government based discourse is cost-effectiveness, which suggests a  
realistic attitude vis-à-vis the legitimate interests of business. But unfortunately,  
cost-effectiveness is not an unambiguous concept; it can be measured in many ways and 
sometimes it is not being measured at all.  
Paradigms of governing the transition to a sustainable energy system  25
6. Governance by corporate business 
This paradigm claims that the private sector, especially corporate business has the pow-
er, the knowledge and the ability to innovate and even make transitions happen. Schum-
peter‟s theory of long waves in capitalist production is particularly interesting to support 
this claim.  
In his monumental work Business Cycles (1939) Schumpeter discerns three interrelated 
cycles of the capitalist economies:
8
 Kitchin cycles, that lasted from top to top 3 to 4 
years, Juglars, that took 8 or 9 years and Kondratieff-waves of about 50 years. Much has 
been written about his suppositions and the statistical flaws with long-term statistical 
time series. But for us it is more interesting to learn about the driving forces behind these 
movements. Much more than other economists Schumpeter focused on Entrepreneurs 
and Innovation.  
An entrepreneur is a person that sets up a New Production Function, a new combination 
of production factors.
9
 It all evolves around Leadership, an insight neglected by Marx 
and the other classical economists according to Schumpeter. One can ask oneself if the 
many failures in the Westerns countries of the big privatization projects of public utilities 
aren‟t due to the neglect of that insight, because those leaders were the former civil  
servants in many instances
10
 Nothing keeps us from considering energy as one of the  
production factors that play a vital role in New Combinations. New Combinations are set 
up to make profits.  
Competition between private companies is central in Schumpeter‟s view on technolo-
gical innovation. Even entrepreneurs that have reached monopoly-like positions will and 
have to keep on innovating in order to prevent themselves from loosing their position in 
the long run. In what he calls Trustified Capitalism they are permanently making  
Research and Development efforts to maintain their leading positions. An additional  
aspect of Schumpeter‟s perspective is that simple cost-benefit calculations are  
considered inadequate. Those calculations are misplaced as far as the question of  
creating sufficient dynamics in the energy sector is concerned. His concept of “creative 
                                                   
8
  The Austrian American economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter is to be  
considered the latest of the representatives of the so-called Austrian school, the group of 
economists that ended with their theory of marginality the efforts of the classical economists 
to build a theory of value of all economic goods and services, based on production costs and 
in the end on a labour theory of value. 
9
  He or she must be discerned from the Manager, whose role it is to arrange a production  
function and also from the “Capitalist”, whose function is to carry risks. (Schumpeter, 1939, 
p. 104).  
10
  One can also wonder if the managerial revolution, that Burnham (1941) already sketched in 
the forties hasn‟t evolved nowadays into a system where most dominant companies are run 
not by Entrepreneurs but by Managers, who succeeded in switching off one of the powerful 
mechanisms of the capitalist system: the risk to have to pay for their own mistakes, which 
was for Schumpeter “one of the causes of the efficiency of private business”. (Schumpeter, 
1939, 1041). 
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destruction”
11
 denotes that destroying production capacity – at a too early stage seen 
from the calculators‟ perspective, is an inevitable consequence of the capitalist dynamic. 
It is a sign of insufficient dynamics if governments and vested interests would succeed in 
letting the existing production functions live their physical lives. 
The shorter waves build up the long ones. The upward phase of those waves consist of 
steeply rising shorter cycles and flat recession phases, while the downward phase of the 
Kondratieff consist of flatly and shortly booming cycles and long and steeply recession 
phases. The expansion phases of the long waves are caused by the introduction of new 
technologies in many sectors of the economy, which occasionally causes disruptions, 
losses of dominant market positions, but also new equilibriums.  
“In every span of time it is easy to locate the ignition of the process and to  
associate it with certain industries and, within these industries, with certain firms, 
from which the disturbances then spread over the system”. (Schumpeter, 1939: 
102). 
Schumpeter expected that the capitalist way of producing would end, (Schumpeter, 
1939: 908), not a very strange expectation in the light of social crisis and of the interna-
tional tensions in the 1930s. Marx believed the end to be the consequence of inherent 
tendencies within the economic system. Crises and cycles were the expression of the 
“law” of the tendency of profits to fall and the momento mori of the system. Schumpeter 
however pointed out that capitalism could break down as the consequence of the  
system‟s tendency to create a social atmosphere hostile to that system. He also believed 
in the viability of other systems: the corporatist system of Nazi Germany and the collec-
tivist system of the Soviet Union. Where private property of the means of production had 
come to an end and the role of entrepreneur, capitalist and manager was taken over by 
the state, the economic process would not go through cyclical movements any more. 
Those views are important in the sense, that he postulates that using a “socialist” set of 
instruments in a capitalist environment is counter-productive.
12
 The last section of  
Business Cycles deals with the “disappointing Juglar” from 1936 onwards. In his view, 
the fact that the cycle of those years in the US doesn‟t run the way it should according to 
his scheme, is a consequence of the use by the Roosevelt administration of socialist  
instruments in a capitalist context. As long as those instruments are complementary to 
innovative investments by the private sector, there is no problem. As soon as public  
investment becomes a substitute and halts private investment, it‟s a different matter. 
                                                   
11
  Schumpeter introduces creative destruction for the first time in his Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1943). It resembles Marx‟ concept of moral versus physical decay of machines. 
It is the insight that the quest for technological rent, that is the entrepreneur‟s preoccupation, 
will lead to a technologically spoken unnecessarily fast destruction of existing production  
capacity, but just that is an essential precondition for the dynamics of the capitalist system.  
12
  See also (Schumpeter, 1943: 55, Schumpeter, 1939: 1037), where he speaks of “The attempt 
to run capitalism in an anti-capitalist way”. 
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More specifically the electro-technical industry, the automobile sector and sectors like 
the rubber and chemical industry behaved as Schumpeter expected. 
13
 So, there was a 
reasonable expansion in many important sectors, together with many small innovations. 
But as Schumpeter goes on, the electricity sector lagged far behind and if it did expand it 
was via public works, and disappointingly little via “privately owned public utilities”, 
(ibid). The downfall of private initiative in the electricity-producing sector was in his 
opinion caused by the anti-capitalistic character of the measures from 1936 and ‟37 that 
had their effects in 38/39. “The Public Utilities Holding Company Act endangered the 
American solution of the fundamental problem of power finance” (Schumpeter, 1939: 
1043). That was because of fear on the side of private initiative for unfair competition 
from public companies.  
So it is not so much the existence of public investments in the power sector that worries 
him: “The development of new sources of power and their competition with the old ones 
is of course part of our process (our italics) and not an impediment to it. In principle it is 
immaterial by whom the new sources of power are developed, whether by public or  
private enterprise.” (Schumpeter, 1939: 1043). It is the political context and the modali-
ties of the state intervention in the power sector that cause the problems. “Executives and 
investors would have had to be completely blind to the political forces that they were  
being marshaled against, if they had been prepared to take the responsibility for, or  
cooperate in, new investment on a large scale” (ibid).  
How then, can and should government shape innovation?  
As far as corporatist systems are concerned Schumpeter points to the enormous invest-
ments done by Nazi Germany in energy production technology (via Braunkohle AG), 
based on hydrogenation that were motivated by policy of autarky. The only problem he 
saw was that this policy was accompanied by prohibiting investments in other energy 
technologies, ruling out competition between alternative technologies (Schumpeter, 
1939: 975). He states that, if there is a strong state, that is not subject to control by  
specific group interests, but has clear goals, a well-directed use of monetary means, that 
prevents waste and inflation and if the use of means is additive to what the entrepreneurs 
would have done anyhow, a state can play an entrepreneurial role. 
Schumpeter defines capitalism as a system, in which entrepreneurs carry out innovations 
with the help of borrowed money
14
. States should not inhibit the functioning of that  
system. States can create infrastructural preconditions, that are additive to the innovation 
processes that are going on anyhow. In that system business is primary relevant because 
it drives technological innovation and considered capable of implementing change in 
these matters.  
Schumpeter‟s plea for a leading role of corporate business especially in capitalist  
societies is to some extend reflected in recent publications from various sides. Jeremy 
                                                   
13
  “Having thus satisfied ourselves that the processes which in the past used to carry prosperi-
ties have not been absent in the present instance, we have established a right to speak of a 
Juglar prosperity and to infer from experience that it would have asserted itself without any 
external impulse being imparted to the system by government expenditure or by any other 
factor”. (Schumpeter, 1939: 1026). 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 28 
Rifkin‟s Creation of the Hydrogen Economy (2002) tends to bear Schumpeterian traces. 
His long-term view on the economics of energy production and consumption systems, 
his neglect of cost aspects, his focus on returns, investment possibilities and on the  
initiatives of big businesses all witness that inspiration.  
In some significant respect, also Shell Internationals scenario study (2001) echoes the 
Schumpeterian view. The scenarios recognize the importance of climate reduction  
targets, the Kyoto protocol and other government policies and interventions. But what 
counts in the end is how the energy companies address international developments and 
public demand. This claim is warranted by the observation that the driving force behind 
corporate strategy is consumer demand. To take this line of argument a little further, the 
bigger the corporation, the more it tends to focus on the preferences and concerns of the 
general public. From this perspective, climate policies are by far not the only relevant 
drivers to a sustainable energy future. Indeed, one Shell scenario, called Business as 
Usual, is based on considerations such as cleanness, security and ultimately sustaina-
bility. The development of renewables like solar is important in this perspective. The 
other scenario, called The Spirit of the Coming Age, focuses on the development of 
(natural gas based) hydrogen, not so much on climate or energy considerations, but  
because a superior technology is preferred by the consumers. The fuel cell becomes pop-
ular because of the huge increase in consumer comfort. Cost considerations do not play a 
remarkable role in any technological trajectory for the long term, in spite of what is so 
often assumed in public policy statements. 
In conclusion, it might be appealing for politics to follow (corporate) business. This 
would not mean that government has nothing left to do. To the contrary, companies 
know exactly when and how to find government if they need support for some activity, 
which embodies both a private and a public interest. Some might argue that this is  
already a long-standing practice. For others, the idea that corporate business works to a 
sustainable energy future might sound very unrealistic as long as the world controls and 
uses relatively cheap oil and other fossil fuels.  
From a government perspective, the idea that corporate business might lead the transition 
to a sustainable energy system might also be frightening. Increased practice of  
accountability vis-à-vis the public and openness to some form of public control on the 
side of corporate business, may mitigate suspicion and distrust on the side of the general 
public. Especially where governments lack the knowledge and the ability to act  
adequately and where corporate businesses has a stake in public trust, government may 
loose relevance. A recent example has been provided in the area of standard setting for 
food production. The European retail sector has joined into EUREPGAP, the European 
Retailers Working Group on Good Agricultural Practice. This institution sets and  
controls standards for the quality and safety of food, thereby actually taking over a  
public function (Van der Grijp, 2003). Although this has not been documented, it might 
very well be that recent crises in European agriculture have triggered this initiative.  
Especially the BSE scare in the United Kingdom in 1996 (Jasanoff, 2001) may be  
considered significant in this respect. As Jasanoff reports, British government was  
                                                                                                                                                
14
  “We have to define that word which good economists always try to avoid: capitalism is that 
form of private property economy in which innovations are carried out by means of borrowed 
money” (1939: 223). 
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paralyzed by this crisis, as she had tried to keep the facts out of publicity even when this 
was no longer an option. The public panic was such that the retail sector took over the 
initiative. It not only informed the public about the risks of eating beef but also, in its 
own interest, started to perform as a public agent vis-à-vis the public. Energy companies, 
who serve a public function quite similar as the retail sector in this case, might initiate 
actions with respect to security of supply or the quality and safety of energy in a crisis 
situation as e.g. Shell did during the oil crisis in the seventies on behalf of the Dutch 
government. So, the risk (or blessing?) inherently linked to the paradigm Governance by 
Corporate Business is, that, in the end, in our type of societies politics is rendered  
irrelevant as far as technological innovation is concerned.  
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7. Governance by challenge 
The main policy claim within this paradigm is that government should address rules, 
regulations and privileges that may stand in the way of innovation. Government inter-
ventions in the market may be justified if they actually improve competition between ex-
isting and new options and strengthen consumer sovereignty. This claim is supported by: 
1. Theories on technological innovation (lock-ins and lock-outs); 
2. Critical social and political theories that focus on the knowledge implications of 
power relationships in society; 
3. Methodological notions developed in policy science on „cognitive impairment‟; 
4. Liberal and radical theories that discuss the risks of a too powerful state. 
Literature on technological innovation has pointed to the importance of technological  
regimes. A technological regime links scientific and technological knowledge and  
expertise to a set of applications and actors or sectors of economy. Innovation can occur 
within and across technological regimes. The inclination to draw upon knowledge and 
knowledge applications available in a regime may lead to incremental growth within a 
given technology path, which is referred to as „lock-in‟. When knowledge from the  
outside is permitted access to a regime, we may witness non-incremental innovations, 
leading to new technological concepts and new applications. 
Especially in the case of pervasive innovations, i.e. technological innovations that  
permeate many sectors, there is an interplay between technological, social and cultural 
change. System innovations, or transitions (Rotmans, 2003) are difficult if not  
impossible to influence (Arentsen e.a., 2002). Characteristic for recognizing system  
innovation as compared to incremental growth or system optimization is that new actors 
and knowledge from „outside‟ step in and, in certain occasions, old actors may step out.  
The same line of reasoning is present in the so-called technology dynamics studies as 
well as in evolutionary economics based on the insights of e.g. Dosi, Nelson and Winter. 
Especially the notion of technological paradigms implies a process of locking-out  
technological possibilities from innovation processes that do not fit within dominant pa-
radigms be it by a cognitive or communication process, by technological regime  
characteristics or by networking exclusion mechanisms.  
It is stressed that in those processes of technological development, innovation and  
diffusion, vested interests specialized or “locked-in” in the old technologies cause  
resistance to the adoption of new technologies. (Mulder, 31).
15
 From a political and  
                                                   
15
  Joseph Schumpeter, again, in his work Business Cycles in many ways paved the way to the 
technology dynamics and evolutionary economics research by stressing the discontinuities 
between the dynamics of the real world and the neo-classical reasoning. Time lags, expecta-
tions, rigidities, technological lags, different types of technological innovations were all to be 
studied according to Schumpeter. In a capitalist surrounding innovation processes tend to be 
unequally distributed in time, destructive in its consequences for sunk investments etc. But 
still, as we have seen, a state should not try to interfere in this processes, because of its  
inability to see and exploit new technological possibilities.  
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institutional perspective, this kind of change does seldom go without struggle. Smooth 
system innovations seem a contradictio in terminis. As Castells (1996) recognized: the 
breakthrough of new pervasive technologies does not take place within the dominant 
networks but in networks that are peripheral at first and even based on deviant  
subcultures. Castells and others thus point to a characteristic of technological networks 
that is not mentioned too often, i.e. that innovation is accompanied by a new articulation 
of power. So in an analogy with Galbraith‟s (1952) concept of countervailing power the 
concept of countervailing networks can be introduced. Such networks may challenge and 
undermine the dominant technological regimes and the institutions through which they 
(inter)act.
16
 Basically, dominant institutions serve to assist stakeholders with vested  
interests in sunk investments to avoid competition and, thereby, postpone pervasive  
innovation.  
From the perspective of Governance by Challenge, the institutions that facilitate tech-
nological regimes cannot be labeled as merely technical or economic but they are politi-
cal as well. Studies in political economy and international relations from a Marxist pers-
pective, have focused on the relationship between economic, political and technological 
(f)actors. They have found that specific socio-economic and political conditions,  
including labor relations, dominant modes of production, styles of policy making and  
international alliances, are being expressed and legitimized in quite coherent concepts of 
control. Concepts of control reflect a specific view on a nation‟s general interest. The 
networks which establish and develop a concept of control recruit their members from 
different business interests, different political parties and different knowledge systems. 
Although such concepts cannot be directly related to specific sectors, business or class 
interests, the specific content of these concepts reflect their origin. In the process of  
political and ideological struggle concepts of control become hegemonic as they succeed 
to legitimize itself as an expression of “the” general interest (Bode, 1978; Overbeek, 
2004; Van der Pijl, 1989).  
In this tradition technological developments are not just answers to specific consumer 
needs, but also to problems in the management of societal conflicts and contradictions 
(Roobeek, 1988; Tulder & June, 1988). Examples of such concepts are Fordism, New 
                                                                                                                                                
 So by calling into question the smooth world view of the neo-classical tradition (at the end of 
the crisis years of the thirties of last century) and by endogenizing technological change, he 
paved the way to a new field of research. (Mulder, 2003, chpt. 2 and Mulder, De Groot and 
Hofkes, 2001). This new field of research originates from the beginning of the eighties, also a 
period of economic stagnation, in which dissatisfaction with neoclassical reasoning,  
especially the Solow and Swan growth model, Harrod and Domar and the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, grew again. Nelson and Winter and Dosi fell back on Schumpeterian  
insights, half a century later! However, by at least in a capitalist surrounding excluding  
government from interfering in the field of technological development and innovation 
Schumpeter did not stimulate the idea of transition management from outside the business 
world. May be that is why Schumpeter is sometimes not very justifiably criticized by authors 
in the field of technology studies. (e.g. Luiten, 26). 
16
  In political science literature the concepts regime and institution might be used inter-
changeably, as they both refer to the formal and informal rules of the game that shape actors‟ 
behaviour. In our vocabulary and in contrast to some other definitions (Young, 1999), the 
concept of institution may also be used to point to the behavioural impacts of organizations.  
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Deal and Keynesianism in the thirties and in the aftermath of the Second World War, al-
so referred to as corporate liberalism, a form of governance that functionally can be 
connected to productive capital (Van der Pijl, 1984a). Afterwards, the stagnation period 
from the seventies and eighties of the last century paved the way to a new hegemonic 
concept, which combined flexible automation technologies, neoliberalism and globaliza-
tion. This concept has been linked to money capital and financial capital (Overbeek, 
1991). On the one hand the production technology of Fordism and the development of 
Scientific Management were made possible by technological breakthroughs, such as the 
use of electricity instead of steam and especially the decentralized use of AC-electricity 
in factories (Geels, 2000). On the other hand, Fordism functioned as a social-political 
project. It offered higher wages enabling the workers to buy the products of their higher 
productivity in exchange for degradation of craftsmanship (Braverman, 1974) and in  
exchange for cooperation between labor unions and business leaders. Fordism developed 
in the United States in the interwar years and was implemented on a national scale by 
New Deal Policies. It was initially blocked in Europe. After the second World War  
Fordism and Open Door policies became dominant in Western Europe helped by the 
Marshal Plan (Van der Pijl, 1984). 
The provision and use of cheap and centrally generated large scale electricity for the 
mass production of goods for mass consumption has always been seen as inherent to 
Fordism (Pacey, 1983 and 1992). It may even be hypothesized that in the sphere of  
energy generation in the mobile and stationary sector the major technologies in the field 
of production and distribution are still very much based on the Fordism, New Deal and 
Keynes paradigm, the concept of control of productive capital, despite the upcoming of a 
new dominant neo-liberal paradigm.
17
  
A critical aspect of the notion of system- or pervasive innovation, articulated in both 
technology studies and in studies by critical political economists and social theorists  
relates to the question why and how power relations interfere with innovation processes. 
At first sight, this question may look a little bit odd. As those innovation processes tend 
to undermine vested interest positions, the „powers that be‟ would be more than likely to 
resist them. For that reason, they may use their resources, including their privileged  
position within the networks of business, policy and expertise, to keep (potential)  
challengers in a position of disadvantage. However, this is not the entire story. The other 
and perhaps more important part of it is that, given the institutionalization of technologi-
cal regimes, or, given the paradigmatic function of concepts of control, the actors  
involved may not be able to see or recognize specific innovations. For this type of cases, 
the famous American political scientist Lindblom (1997) has introduced the concept 
„cognitive impairment‟. This concept does not refer to a person‟s intelligence but to the 
way institutional conditions shape peoples‟ capacity to take notice of what happens in 
the world around them. Cognitive impairment is therefore considered a huge impediment 
for initiating change. In practice, resistance to change on the side of powerful stakehold-
ers may have a dual background, on the one hand they do not want it, on the other they 
                                                   
17
  The development and interplay of Fuel Cell, Hydrogen and Internet technologies, that enable 
so-called Distributed Generation (US), or experiments with the “Virtuele Energy Centrale” in 
Germany and the Netherlands e.g. can cause the rise and breakthrough of new technological 
as well as political paradigmatic views in the energy sector. (Rifkin, 2002; Lovins, 1999).  
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don‟t see its opportunities. That cognitive impairment is an important institutional factor 
in shaping the viability of sustainable energy options is illustrated by the observation 
that, in spite of the fact that international epistemic communities have come into  
existence, national states, even within the EU, show quite some variation in this respect. 
It is likely that historical and political factors rather than technological ones can explain 
France‟s preference for nuclear, Germany as forerunner with respect to biomass and the 
US preference for fossil. What may remain unnoticed in one country or within a cross-
national paradigm, can become a success story of innovation in another.  
Hence, a transition strategy must be aimed at overcoming cognitive impairments  
(Lindblom, 1997; Dunn, 1997; Argyris, 1997). Dunn (2001: 425 -6) specifies this point 
where he concludes: “From the standpoint of communication theory and language, the 
information content of a hypothesis tends to be negatively related to its relative  
frequency, or probability of occurrence. Hypotheses that are mentioned more frequently 
– those on which there is substantial consensus – have less probative value than rarely 
mentioned hypotheses, because highly probable or predictable hypotheses do not  
challenge accepted knowledge claims.” From this perspective, a transition process may 
be considered successful to the extent it succeeds in identifying and exploring hypothes-
es and options that are marginal from the perspective of dominant networks.  
The ability to bring initially marginal options and hypotheses to bear is for one part  
dependant on the approaches and methods used in scientific analysis, which can be  
referred to as „problem structuring‟, for another part it depends on politics. The political 
task in this respect is to address vested interests. Given the notion that transitions may 
lead to a new articulation of interests in the energy system, which is at the core of this 
paradigm, governing the transition would certainly not imply to exclude these interests 
from participation. The guiding principle for governance according to this paradigm, 
should however be to remove, as much as possible, the privileges that vested interests 
may use to resist innovations. These privileges may be found for most part in the rules, 
regulations and institutions maintained by government itself. We will elaborate this  
position with reference to two very different types of writings, first a participatory  
assessment „avant la lettre‟ carried out by the French sociologist Touraine during the 
1970s and then, the political theory of the famous 19th century British thinker, J.S. Mill.  
In La Prophétie anti-nucléire, Touraine (1980) describes the social movements that were 
aroused by the decision of the French government to develop nuclear energy as the pa-
ramount generation technique (“tout électrique-tout nucléaire”). At the background of 
French nuclear policy, there was the hidden agenda to further develop the surrégénera-
teur, the breeder reconversion reactor technology as a means to obtain the foodstuff for 
nuclear bombs
18
. Touraine and colleagues organized what we would call a dialogue 
these days, in order to discuss the positions that social and labor movements could take 
with respect to the nuclear question. The major objection that came out of this dialogue 
against the French nuclear program was not so much the risk issue, the doubts about the 
                                                   
18
  The “snelle kweek reactor technology” was developed in the Netherlands by Prof. Kisten-
maker. His Urenco co-operator dr. Khan stole that technology, after which he quickly  
became head of the Pakistan atomic energy program. His activities caused a rapid  
proliferation of relatively cheap nuclear technology to a.o. what are nowadays considered  
to be crooked states.  
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safety or the storage of nuclear waste. The most profound resistance related to “la société 
programmée”. There was the fear that nuclear power technology would get beyond  
democratic control. Political power would more and more be concentrated in the hands 
of a few, the experts within the state. The security issue would be used as a justification 
against public control and participation. The prophetical about that struggle, to use Tou-
raines phrasing, was that it foreshadowed a fight against a society in which the  
authorities could not be made accountable of their actions with respect to the security  
aspects of nuclear installations. Transparency and accountability would contradict the 
needs of security.  
So, the struggle of social movements against nuclear power would, in a sense, become a 
struggle to defend a classical liberal conception of democracy against a technocratic pa-
radigm of governance. The concern that comes out of the French dialogue does  
certainly not stand on its own. During the 1970s and 1980s, many publications warned 
against technocracy taking over in western democracies. This critique was not restricted 
to radical theorists. The well-known Yale professor Dahl (1985) published Controlling 
nuclear weapons: Democracy versus guardianship, where he analyzed the boundaries 
between political philosophies that argue for a concentration of power in the hands of 
„experts‟ and democratic theories. Remarkably, also the Brundtland report (1987)  
mentions democracy as one of the criteria for sustainable development, thereby de facto 
taking argument with life-boat ethics who argue that some sort of authoritarian rule may 
be needed to safeguard the world from environmental disaster.  
The radical and liberal rejection of a government that becomes too powerful has its roots 
in political philosophies, from conservatives like Hayek (1944), liberals like Rawls 
(1971) to anarchists like Taylor (1982). In order to complete the discussion on  
Governance as Challenge we will now focus on the work of J.S. Mill, not only because 
he is one of the most famous liberal theorists ever, but also because he combines a view 
on restricted government vis-à-vis individual freedom with a plea for specific interven-
tions in the interest of future generations.  
Mill‟s central focus, which permeates his work is that of the individual freedom versus 
society or the state. His point of departure is that “there is a circle around every  
individual human being, which no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of many, 
ought to be permitted to overstep” (Mill, 1957: 571). And he states with disapproval that 
“every increase of the functions devolving on the government is an increase of its power, 
both in the form of authority and still more in the indirect form of influence.” (Mill, 
1876: 570). There is basically no restriction on individual freedom, as long as there is no 
harm done to other individuals. Especially in the case of competition it is in Mill‟s eyes 
best for society as a whole, when individuals try to reach their goals and interests  
without having in mind the negative effects that may have for competitors. Only in case 
of fraud, deceit and violence the state is allowed to come to help the losers in this battle-
field. Mill considers individuals the best judges of their own interest (Mill, 1876: 583) 
and the consumer a competent judge of the commodity (ibidem, 575). And he comes to 
the general conclusion as far as the role of government is concerned: “in all the more  
advanced communities the great majority of things are worse done by the intervention of 
government, than the individuals most interested in the matter would do them, or cause 
them to be done, if left to themselves” (ibidem, 571).  
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Mill lists a number of – in his eyes – unwarranted examples of state intervention. But he 
also admits, with some regret, that – apart from law enforcement - there are basically 
four legitimate reasons for government to interfere with private actions. These are  
(1) unequal distribution of knowledge or information, (2) concentration of power in  
markets, (3) free-riding and (4) considerations with respect to philosophical foresight, 
that is the interests of all humankind, the nation or next generations. Below, we will  
discuss the second and the fourth reason.  
As regards the second point, Mill argues against the formation of monopolies and – at 
least – to take away unjustified benefits for monopolists: “I have already more than once 
adverted to the case of the gas and water companies, among which though perfect free-
dom is allowed to competition, none really takes place, and practically they are found to 
be even more irresponsible and unapproachable by individual complaints than the  
government.” (Mill, 1876: 581) With respect to the question how the London water  
supply can best be managed, Mill states that “the case is one of those in which a practical 
monopoly is unavoidable. It delivers over the public to the mercy of those individuals” 
(Mill, 1957: 434). Hence, government may take over this task, not as a matter of princi-
ple but “of practical expediency”. What is interesting here is that Mill explicitly refers to 
the rights of consumers and not to financial and economic reasons (lack of private profit) 
for government intervention. In fact, Mill suggests that consumers should be able to  
enact some form of control over the companies that deliver this kind of services.   
As regards the fourth point Mill refers to occasions “in which the acts done by individu-
als, though intended solely for their own benefit, involve consequences extending indefi-
nitely beyond them, to interests of the nation or of posteriority, for which society in its 
collective capacity is alone able, and alone bound, to provide” (Mill, 1957: 585). Mill 
mentions several examples that justify government intervention, especially if it exceeds 
“narrow limits of purely economic considerations.”  
To wrap up, Mill‟s writings make a case for a paradigm of governance which is based on 
the following considerations: (a) to restrict its own power vis-à-vis citizens and  
economic actors, (b) to limit the power of monopolies and other vested interests for the 
sake of consumer sovereignty and control, which may or may not lead to an extension of 
specific government tasks and (c) intervene if private actions have consequences for  
future generations (or any other form of externalization). Basically, Mill‟s liberal  
philosophy underlies one guiding principle, i.e. that governance must enhance competi-
tion between ideas and, therefore, take away barriers that may obstruct this. In conclu-
sion, Governance by challenge may yield either generic or specific measures, if they are 
justified by this purpose and do not interfere unjustifiably with the freedom of consumers 
and producers to pursue their interests. 
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8. Conclusions and discussion  
This report has given some idea of how paradigms of governance might shape the  
possibilities for specific technological options and trajectories. We have looked into this 
matter first, in Chapter 3, from the perspective of five technological options, all electric, 
hydrogen stationary, syngas for stationary purposes, demand management and fuel cells 
for the transport sector. These technologies were analyzed with respect to some institu-
tional variables, the strategic interest security of supply, the collective or private  
character of the option, especially its infrastructure requirements, freedom for  
consumers, the degree of centralization it implies, risks for externalization of costs  
involved (free riding).  
In Chapter 3, we found a relationship between different technological trajectories and 
strategies of governance to exist. With respect to the specific relationship we formulated 
certain hypotheses that may be further researched. We suggest that certain choices need 
to be made, such as a choice between infrastructures, all electric, hydrogen stationary 
and (syn)gas in particular. Another choice relates to balancing infrastructure require-
ments and the strategic relevance of security of supply. We suggest that options which 
may be beneficial from a security of supply position, demand management in particular, 
are not that much linked with vested interests with a high stake in existing or new infra-
structure. We also found that the governance required is not the same for each option, 
given the varying complexity of infrastructure requirements. We hypothesize that the 
lower and less complex infrastructure requirements, the more it will be possible to  
govern the transition through traditional regulatory instruments or environmental agree-
ments, possibly in combination with new instruments such as tradable emission permits.  
We also hypothesize that the higher and more complex infrastructure requirements, the 
greater the likelihood that major government interventions will be needed. Especially in 
case of a breakthrough of decentralized electricity production, possibly in combination 
with hydrogen, society may be faced with a dual problem: On the one hand, such a  
development may be resisted by all (otherwise competing) vested interests in the energy 
system (unless these interests become redefined), on the other hand (new) infrastructure 
needs may come up quite suddenly. It is questionable as to whether these needs can be 
flexibly addressed. Experts do not consider this option very likely, but it is still relevant 
for our analysis. It shows after all that even if this option would become technologically 
feasible, cost-effective and attractive to business or consumers, it may witness major  
institutional barriers that require a specific type of governance.  
We finally hypothesize that consumer sovereignty might remain restricted in most  
options, given the collective good character of large scale infrastructures. This may not 
have immediate implications for governance. However, if under the condition of limited 
choice security of supply is at stake, this may have major political and legal repercus-
sions.  
Chapter 4-7 discussed four paradigms of governance respectively. These were labeled 
Governance by Government, Governance by Policy Networking, Governance by  
Corporate Business and Governance by Challenge. For a good understanding it must be 
pointed out that none of these paradigms reject government intervention. Laws,  
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regulations, standards and even (relatively) new instruments such as environmental 
agreements or tradable emission permits and even specific technology support are an  
option in more than one paradigm, although each paradigm reveals a preference for  
certain instruments. Even within the paradigm Governance by Corporate Business  
instruments such as progressive standard setting or tradable permits are possible, as long 
as they do not interfere with corporate strategies.  
Table 8.1 summarizes our tentative thoughts with respect to the relationship between pa-
radigms, instrumentation and technological options. Table 8.1 should be interpreted in 
the Dutch context, where natural gas is important as a national sector. It is assumed that 
electricity will become part of international (foreign) companies. These companies may 
successfully resist the Dutch natural gas bias. The Netherlands may benefit from innova-
tions (all electric) from abroad, in as far the domestic sector is involved. Instead,  
Governance by Government will focus on national interests for reasons related to  
security of supply, whereas Government by challenge will foster security of supply by 
innovation, which enables a combination of centralized and decentralized options. We 
assume that Networking focus on realizing incremental options only. We also assume 
that, depending on the political will to intervene with regulations as well as on technolo-
gical solutions for current infrastructure problems, climate neutral transport fuels will be 
possible, as there is already a trend in corporate business to make a shift from oil to natu-
ral gas.  
Apart from the specific implications for technology, it is the question how the paradigms 
of governance, which are – after all – authors‟ constructs derived from political theories, 
may relate to empirically observable governance strategies. We expect that combinations 
are possible, especially since policies are sector oriented, which might make it possible 
to link the paradigms to different sectors. We expect in practice that certain paradigms 
tend to exclude one another, i.e. Governance by Government versus Governance by  
Policy Networking and Governance by Corporate Business versus Governance by  
Challenge. The first distinction relates to the traditional top-down versus participation 
dichotomy, whereas the second distinction relates to the issue of justice, i.e. as to wheth-
er government must choose in favor of interests that are in a disadvantaged  
position.  
Governance by Challenge may be considered a hybrid in that it articulates claims and  
assumptions from each of the other paradigms. It shares the notion of stakeholder  
participation with Policy Networking, but it stresses the demand for involving new actors 
in the networks. Specifically interesting is the question as to whether government might 
have a justification to support specific technologies. Dutch stakeholders from business 
have expressed a preference for „early mover‟ initiatives by government (Hisschemöller 
and Van de Kerkhof, 2004). Traditionally, this claim has been endorsed by the paradigm 
Governance by Government, but, since the 1980s, this paradigm has lost a lot of credit 
because it led to intransparent connections between government and business.  
Governance by Challenge provides a new justification for government interventions,  
generic as well as specific. A generic policy could be to support, by alleviating taxes,  
climate neutral transport fuels, be it biofuels or fuel cells combined with CO2 removal 
and storage from natural gas. The demand for early mover initiatives with respect to  
specific cases of promising innovation is inter alia supported by the claim that  
surrounding countries (Germany, France) already do this, but also have a competitive 
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advantage because of their size. A significant difference with the kind of government 
support anticipated in Governance by Government is that government should not shape 
innovation trajectories by ex ante deciding what options might be most feasible, as is 
current practice. Business itself should initiate the innovation and demonstrate a willing-
ness to invest. The preference for private business initiatives may link Challenge also to 
Government by Corporate Business. So it seems as if from a stakeholder perspective, 
Governance by Challenge may offer an alternative for incremental networking practice.  
Table 8.1 A tentative view on the relationship between paradigms of governance,  
policy instrumentation and technological options for the Netherlands. 
 Governance by 
Government 
Governance by 
Policy  
Networking 
Governance by  
Corporate  
Business 
Governance by  
Challenge 
Policy  
instrumentation 
All instruments 
except  
environmental 
agreements 
All instruments All except specific  
technology  
support 
All instruments 
Options     
All electric Yes 
Large scale  
No Yes 
If infrastructure 
need can be  
privately  
addressed 
Yes 
Large scale and  
decentralized  
H2 stationary  Yes 
Large scale, al-
so coal or  
nuclear based 
No 
Adding H2 to 
gas grid 
No 
 
Yes 
If chp can be  
combined with  
decentralized  
renewables and  
biomass 
Syngas No Yes Yes No 
Demand  
management 
Yes 
Large scale  
insulation  
programs 
Yes 
Only in  
construction / 
renovation 
No Yes 
Large scale  
insulation programs 
Fuel cells  
transport 
Yes 
By regulation 
and infrastruc-
ture support 
? Yes 
By regulation and  
infrastructure  
support 
Yes 
By regulation and  
infrastructure  
support 
 
In conclusion, this report offers four paradigms that may all be(come) significant under 
specific circumstances but may also give rise to a discussion on opportunities for politi-
cal choice in an era of liberalization. If this report might carry any policy advice, it 
would be to take Governance as Challenge seriously as an alternative for the Policy 
Networking paradigm, as it may combine private initiative with an impetus of technolo-
gical innovation. But also other paradigms may be seriously considered, as they may all 
provide a policy framework governing the transition to a sustainable energy  
system.  
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